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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Constitutional Law-Taxation-Special Taxes on
Liquor Dealers in Dry States.'
A federal statute imposes annual taxes on all dealers in alcoholic
beverages, at the following rates: retail beer $20, retail liquor $25,
wholesale beer $50, wholesale liquor $100.2 Another federal statute
imposes in addition an annual tax of $1,000 on any person carrying on
any such business contrary to the laws of any state or municipality.8
In two cases the plaintiffs, residents of the dry states of Alabama and
Georgia respectively, who had paid the taxes imposed under the first
statute, 4 asked that defendant revenue officers be enjoined from collecting by distraint the assessment of $1,000 on the ground that it was
not a revenue measure, but a penalty to regulate and prohibit liquor
dealing in dry territories,8 a matter beyond the control of Congress.
'The question of territorial uniformity is not treated in this note; however, it
was held in United States v. Kesterson, 8 F. Supp. 680 (N. D. OkI. 1934) that the
statute here considered did meet the constitutional requirement of uniformity. But
in Constantine v. United States,--F. (2d)-(C. C. A. 5th, 1935) the court
expressed grave doubt, should the act be construed as imposing an excise tax, that
it meets the uniformity requirement.
'20 STAT. 333, 342 (1879), 26 U. S. C. A. §205 (1928).
144 STAT. 95 (1926), 26 U. S. C. A. §206 (1928). This statute provided a
special excise tax of $1000 to be paid annually by every person carrying on the
business of a "brewer, distiller, wholesale liquor dealer, retail liquor dealer, wholesale dealer in malt liquor, retail dealer in malt liquor, or manufacturer of stills
. ..in any State, Territory, or District of the United States contrary to the laws
of such State, Territory, or District, or in any place therein in which carrying on
such business is prohibited by local or municipal law." The statute does not
exempt any person from any "punishment or penalty" provided by local law or
authorize them to do business contrary to local law. The act provides further that
if any person does business in a dry territory without paying the $1000 tax, he
subjects himself to a fine of as much as $1000, or maximum imprisonment of one
year, or both. The statute was passed originally in the Revenue Act of 1918
together with the Child Labor Tax and the tax on grain futures, both of which
have been declared unconstitutional. The original statute'was reanacted in 1921,
1924, and 1926; but as it now stands, it is treated as dating back to the Revenue
Act of 1918: United States v. La Franca, 282 U. S. 568, 572, 51 Sup. Ct. 278, 75
L. ed. 551 (1931).
'20 STAT. 333, 342 (1879), 26 U. S. C. A. §205 (1928), supra note 2.
'After

the passage of

REvIsED STATUTES

§3224, 26 U. S. C. A. §154 (1928),

prohibiting the enjoining of any tax, grounds which usually give equity jurisdiction, such as resulting multiplicity of suits, or cloud on title, or unconstitutionality were specifically rejected. Dodge v. Osborn, 240 U. S. 118, 36 Sup. Ct. 275,
60 L. ed. 557 (1916). A "penalty" designed to regulate and prohibit, as contradistinguished from a "tax" designed to raise revenue, is not collectible by distraint
,proceedings, 26 U. S. C. A. §142 (1928), and may be enjoined since it does not

come within the prohibition of the injunction statute. Lipke v. Lederer, 259
U. S.557, 42 Sup. Ct. 549, 66 L. ed. 1061 (1922) ; Miller, Restraining the Collection
of Federal Taxes and Penallies by Injunctions (1923) 71 U. PA. L. Rav. 318. It
was urged in Cleveland v. Davis, 9 F. Supp. 337 (S. D. Ala. 1934) that the bill
to enjoin the so-called tax of $1000 on liquor dealers should be dismissed because
plaintiff did not come into equity with clean hands since the bill showed he was
doing business in the state of Alabama contrary to its laws; the court held that
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Held, injunctions granted. 6 In a third case the defendant was convicted in the Northern District of Alabama for selling liquor without having paid the $1,000 tax; on appeal the conviction was reversed
on the ground that the statute did not impose a tax, and that it "imposed a penalty as part of the enforcing machinery of the Eighteenth
Amendment, and fell with it."

'

7

the government was not in -position to raise the question, for by its statutes and
regulations it put plaintiff in a position where he was absolutely remedyless unless
the court would give him relief.
Cleveland v. Davis, 9 F. Supp. 337 (S. D. Ala. 1934) (The court held the
$1000 "tax" was a penalty, declaring: (1) that the exaction could not be a revenue
measure because "Congress would have no right to impose two taxes or a double
tax on the same business done at the same place," and the twenty-five dollars imposed under the first statute is the value Congress put upon the right to retail
liquor everywhere; (2) that the lump sum applicable to the different dealers alike
in the dry territories in disregard of the previous classification of the dealers
everywhere was penal in its nature; and (3) that this was an attempt to punish
for the violation of the local laws, a power which Congress does not have).
Green v. Page, 9 F. Supp. 844 (S. D. Ga. 1935) (This case went further than
the preceding case to -hold that crime was the basis of the imposition, and that the
statute imposing the "tax," which was too high to produce revenue, was unconstitutional. Significance was attached to the fact that a high revenue official had
pronounced, in a radio address, that the "tax" was prohibitive; and that the
revenue department did not list this so-called tax with the liquor taxes on forms
sent to their collectors and did not try to collect it for several months after the
repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment).
'Constantine v. United States,--F. (2d)-(C. C. A. 5th, 1935) The District
Court thought the intention and effect of the statute to impose a tax was plain
on its face; that it was valid, and that since defendant failed to pay the $1000
assessment, after having paid the twenty-five dollar tax imposed on all retail
liquor dealers, he was subject to be prosecuted and convicted under it. The
Circuit Court did not "find the statutory intent and effect so plain as that its
history and administrative interpretation may not be looked to for the light they
throw." In deciding whether the act imposed a tax or a penalty, the court laid
down the rule that "the question must be determined from a consideration of its
language, its operation and effect, and particularly the consequences which one or
the other construction will entail." In holding the imposition a penalty the court
declared it was "beyond question that its function and purpose was to penalize
and prohibit" on the ground that: (1) the language of the act requiring all types
of dealers to pay the same amount instead of, as liquor taxing acts do, "making
the exaction fit the business done ;" (2) the history of the act from its first introduction Feb. 24, 1919 just prior to the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment;
(3) the fact that the imposition during the existence of the National Prohibition
Act and the Eighteenth Amendment was judicially treated as a penalty; (4) the
administrative rulings and acts of departmental officers treating it as a penalty;
and (5) the failure of Congress to reenact the statute after the repeal of the
Eighteenth Amendment. The court concluded that "it was enacted as a penalty,
not a tax, and that it may not now, the Amendment which authorized it repealed,
be enforced as a penalty."
It was held in United States v. La Franca, 282 U. S. 568, 572, 51 Sup. Ct. 278,
75 L. ed. 551 (1931) that, although the original statute was reenacted in 1921,
1924, and 1926, the $1000 tax was imposed 'by an act in force prior to the National
Prohibition Act and the Eighteenth Amendment. Accepting this as the law,
quaere as to whether the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment repealed a statute
passed prior to said Amendment? It seems that the better view is that the statute
was passed originally as a regulatory or prohibitory measure without constitutional
authority; that it Nvas subsequently validated by the Eighteenth Amendment giving
Congress the authority to regulate intrastate liquor traffic, and that by the repeal
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It may be difficult to determine whether a statute is a regulatory
or a revenue measure, yet the consequences of the distinction are material "when one sovereign can impose a tax only, while the power of regulation rests in another." s A tax of ten cents a pound on butter substitutes designed to protect the dairy interests,0 a tax of $300 a pound
on the manufacture of opium designed to restrict its manufacture, 10
and a registration tax of one dollar on dispensers of dope for the purpose of regulating its sale," notwithstanding their regulatory character, were held to be taxes 'because "on their face" they were acts to
raise revenue. The courts laid down the rule that they could not go beyond the face of the act to determine the motive or purpose of Congress.
This trend toward a system of regulation through the taxing power in
2
derogation of state rights was checked in the Child Labor Tax Case.'
It was there held that a "tax" of ten per cent on the net profits of anyof the Eighteenth Amendment the act reverted to its original status and is therefore again unconstitutional.
' Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20, 38, 42 Sup. Ct. 449, 66 L. ed.
817 (1922). See Note (1926) 10 MixN. L. REv. 511.
9
McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 24 Sup. Ct. 769, 49 L. ed. 78 (1904)
(There was a tax of only one-fourth of one cent on the plain oleomargarine while
the tax on the colored was ten cents a pound. It was well known that this was a
regulatory measure but the court confined itself to the "face of the act" to hold

it a tax). See Cushman, The National Police Power Under the Taxing Clause of
the Constitution (1920) 4 MixN. L. Rav. 247.
"Lee Mow Lin v. United States, 250 Fed. 694 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918) (The
statute provided that a "tax of $300 per pound shall be levied and collected upon all
opium manufactured in the United States for smoking purposes ...

."

This court

followed the test set up in the McCray Case, and stated at page 696, "The law on
its face is a law imposing a tax for revenue purposes. The tax imposed of $300
a pound on all opium manufactured for smoking purposes may be so high as to
defeat the purpose of raising revenue, but the power to tax, as has been said, is
the -power to destroy.")
2 United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86, 39 Sup. Ct. 214, 63 L. ed. 493 (1919)
(The court went further in this case than in the previous cases to uphold a detailed
system of regulation and control of the drug traffic under 38 STAT. 785 (1914),
wherein the court practically admitted the moral purpose of the act, but upheld
the government's argument that, on its face, its main purpose was revenue, and
since Congress had power to tax, the judiciary would not look beyond the statute.
The court was of the opinion that the regulatory provisions of the law could not
be said to have no reasonable relation to the collection of the revenue although the
tax amounted to only one dollar).
"Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20, 42 Sup. Ct. 449, 66 L. ed. 817
(1922) (The court found here that the statute did not impose a tax with only an
incidental restraint and regulation which a tax must inevitably involve, but that
it attempted to regulate by a so-called tax. Chief Justice Taft was fearful of the
invasion of state rights: "Grant the validity of the law, and all that Congress
would have to do hereafter in seeking to take over to its control any one of the
great number of subjects of public interest, jurisdiction over which is reserved
to the states by the Tenth Amendment to the federal Constitution, would be to
enact a detailed regulation of the subject and enforce it with a so-called 'tax' upon
departures from it. To give such magic to the word tax would be to break down
all constitutional limitations of the power of Congress and completely wipe out
the sovereignty of the states." See also Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44, 42 Sup. Ct.
453, 66 L. ed. 822 (1922).
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one who knowingly' 3 employed child labor 14 in certain businesses was
in fact a penalty to prohibit employment of children, and not a tax for
revenue. 15 The court did not purport to reject the test applied in the
earlier cases, but did apply it and found on the face of the act features which marked it as a regulatory rather than a revenue measure.
Yet the Child Labor Tax Case seems inharmonious with the prior deci17
sions although expressly' 6 it does not overrule them.
What, then, is the status of the $1,000 liquor tax involved in the
principal cases? The special taxes upon the occupation of liquor dealers, which were enacted prior to the Eighteenth Amendment, remained
in force' s but took on a "new character and status under the Eighteenth
Amendment;" 19 they were said to be no longer exactions for revenue purposes. They became "penalties or fines imposed for criminal
misconduct." 20 The $1,000 assessment was included in the assessment
on the defendants in Thome v. Lync, 21 and it was adjudged a penalty on
the ground that where an exaction is made by governmental authority

upon an occupation which is expressly prohibited as criminal 'by the
"The court stressed the element of scienter, that the employer must know that
the child is under age and that he is departing from the prescribed course, else he
is not subject to the assessment. The court added, "Scienters are associated with
penalties, not -with taxes."
"The amount was not to be proportioned in any degree to the extent or frequency of the departures, but was, as the court stated at page 36, "to be paid by
the employer in full measure whether he employs five hundred children for a year,
or employs only one for a day."
I The court stated that this case could not be distinguished from Hammer v.
Daggenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 529, 62 L. ed. 1101 (1918) which held unconstitutional the effort of Congress to regulate the hours of labor of children by
means of a prohibition against the movement in interstate commerce of ordinary
commercial commodities which they helped to produce. See Powell, Child Labor,
Congress, and the Constitution (1922) 1 N. C. L. REv. 61.
"IBailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20, 40-43, 42 Sup. Ct. 449, 66 L. ed.
817 (1922) (The court discussed and distinguished the preceding cases).
IzIt seems that the court could very well have followed the previous cases to
sustain the Child Labor Tax, but it seems to have recognized that Congress was
encroaching too much upon the reserved police power of the states and found
features on the face of the act sufficient to distinguish this act from those previously sustained and which were almost as far reaching, and passed with the
same regulatory intent. See Note (1922) 71 U. PA. L. REy. 54.
u La Franca v. United States, 37 F. (2d) 269 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930).
" Thome v. Lynch, 269 Fed. 995, 1003 (D. Minn. 1921).
0 La Franca v. United States, 37 F. (2d) 269, 270 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930).
'269 Fed. 995, 1007 (D. Minn. 1921). Assessment against one defendant:
$ 25.00
1. Taxes on retail liquor dealer, R. S. §3224 ...........................
25.00
2. Above tax doubled by §35 of Nat. Prohibition Act....................
12.50
3. Penalty of 25% on (1) and (2) under R. S. §3176 ...................
4. Special tax on liquor dealer under 26 U. S. C. A. §206 ................ 1,000.00
5. Above tax doubled by §35 of Nat. Prohibition Act ................... 1,000.00
500.00
6. Penalty of 25% on (4) and (5) under R. S. §3176 ...................
7. Special penalty provided by §35 of Nat. Prohi. Act ................. 500.00
8. 5% penalty under R. S. §3186 .......................................

$3,062.50
$ 153.13
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same governmental authority, the exaction is a penalty unless it is
clearly shown to be made for revenue purposes.2 2 Section 35 of the
National Prohibition Act 23 doubled the tax on the preexisting dealer's
licenses. In reference to that section, the Supreme Court in United
States v. La Franca24 declared:
"This, in reality, is but to say that a person who makes an illegal sale
shall be liable to pay a 'tax' in double the amount of the tax imposed
by preexisting law for making a legal sale, which existing law makes it
impossible to make.. . the exaction here involved is not a true tax, but
a penalty involving the idea of punishment for infraction of the law."
The imposition was held a penalty, not because it was doubled, but because the occupation taxed had become unlawful. 25 Although the statute
was here considered in connection with the National Prohibition Act,
it seems the same thing may be said of the $1,000 "tax" standing alone
following the adoption of the Twenty-first Amendment because the
sole basis of the assessment is illegality,-the carrying on of a liquor
business in violation of the law of a state or municipality. It would
seem that the exaction is not a true tax but remains "a penalty involving
the idea of punishment for infraction of the law" of dry territories.
The La Franca Case expressly2 6 does not overrule the decision in
United States v. One Ford Coupe Autonwbile, 27 which held that the
basic production tax on liquor did not become a penalty under the
Eighteenth Amendment because the tax had always been applied to
'Thome v. Lynch, 269 Fed. 995, 1003 (D. Minn. 1921).
27 U. S. C. A. §52 (1928).
282 U. S. 568, 572, 51 Sup. Ct. 278, 75 L. ed. 551 (1931) (Civil suit by the
United States to recover for non-payment of the double taxes, including the taxes
levied by both statutes considered in the principal cases of this note and the
additional penalty of $500 incurred 'by defendant's liquor sale in violation of the
National Prohibition Act. Defendant pleaded in bar his prior conviction in a
criminal prosecution for the same illegal sales. Held, the "tax" clearly involved
the idea of punishment for infraction of law; the suit for these penalties, notwithstanding it was civil in form, amounted to a second punishment for the same
acts, and the first prosecution barred the second action).
Thome v. Lynch, 269 Fed. 995 (D. Minn. 1921).
2282 U. S. 568, 572, 51 Sup. Ct.278, 75 L. ed. 551 (1931).
1272 U. S. 321, 47 Sup. Ct. 278, 71 L. ed. 279 (1926) (This decision was to
the effect that the law taxing liquor was not in conflict with the law prohibiting its
manufacture because the tax applies to the manufacture the same whether it was
legally or illegally made. The court, at page 328, declared, "A tax on intoxicating
liquors does not cease to be such because the sovereign has declared that none
shall be manufactured, and because the main purpose in retaining the tax is to
make law-breaking less profitable. . . . What was sought to be enforced and held
to be a penalty in Lipke v. Lederer . . . was the so-called double tax. Here we are
dealing with the basic production tax.") Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U. S. 557, 42 Sup.
Ct. 549, 66 L. ed. 1061 (1922), referred to in the preceding case, held that the
special license taxes doubled by §35 of the National Prohibition Act had become
penal in their nature and must be treated as penalties although designated as taxes.
The government was enjoined from collecting these doubled taxes by distraint on
the ground that they were penalties and not within the scope of the statute preventing the enjoining of any taxes.
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all liquor whether manufactured legally or illegally; otherwise any
liquor unlawfully manufactured would be exempt from the tax.
No question is raised as to the validity of the tax imposed by the
statute levying taxes on alt dealers in alcoholic beverages, 28 because it
was early established by the License Tax Cases 9 that a tax applicable
everywhere over the country applied to the sale of liquor in the dry as
well as the wet states; naturally illegal sales should not be exempt from
taxation. The payment of this tax does not authorize the dealing in
liquor but simply privileges the licensee from penal interference by the
federal government during the period covered by the so-called license. 30
The $1,000 tax is sui generis,-the sole basis of the imposition being the
violation of local laws, usually criminal offenses. It would seem the
intention to derive revenue from taxes on criminal offenses as such
should not be imputed to Congress. 31
It may not be inferred solely from the heavy burden of a tax that
a prohibition was intended;32 but there is an indefinite limit beyond
which a so-called tax ripens into a penalty, dependent upon the circumstances in the individual statute.3 3 The taxes imposed by the first
20

STAT. 333, 342 (1879), 26 U. S. C. A. §205 (1928), supra note 2.
72 U. S. 462, 18 L. ed. 497 (1866) (13 STAT. 248 (1864) provided that no
person should retail liquor without first obtaining a license from -the United States.
The statute is vastly different from the $1000 tax statute in question which is
dependent upon crime for its application).
' North Carolina -provides by statute, N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931)
§3379 (1), that proof of possession of a federal license for the sale of liquors is
prina facie evidence of a violation of the state law prohibiting possession of intoxicating liquors for purpose of sale.
"Thome v. Lynch, 269 Fed. 995, 1003 (D. Minn. 1921). It would seem that
the imposition of a so-called tax upon any one who commits a specified criminal
offence has as its purpose punishment for the commission of the crime. It should
not matter that the offense be against the laws of a state instead of the laws of
the federal govermnt since the statute has adopted the "criteria of wrongdoing."
'Trusler v. Crooks, 269 U. S. 475, 46 Sup. Ct. 165, 70 L. ed. 365 (1926) (In
declaring that the federal "tax" of twenty cents per bushel on the dealing in
grain "futures" was unconstitutional because regulatory, the court recognized that
it could not infer prohibition solely from the heavy burden of the exaction.
Nevertheless, in determining that the so-called tax was a penalty, the court attached significance to the fact that there would be a total destruction by the tax
of the thing taxed); cf. Magnano v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40, 54 Sup. Ct. 599, 78
L. ed. 1109 (1934) ; Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 55 Sup. Ct. 333 (1935).
Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20, 38, 42 Sup. Ct. 449, 66 L. ed.
817 (1922) ("Taxes are occasionally imposed in the discretion of the legislature
on proper subjects with the primary motive of obtaining revenue from them, and
with the incidental motive of discouraging them -by making their continuance
onerous. They do not lose their character as taxes because of the incidental
motive. But there comes a time in the extension of the penalizing features of
the so-called tax when it loses its character as such and becomes a mere penalty,
with the characteristics of regulation and punishment. Such is the case in the
law before us. Although Congriss does not invalidate the contract of employment,
or expressly declare that the employment within the mentioned ages is illegal, it
does exhibit its intent practically to achieve the latter result by adopting the
criteria of wrongdoing, and imposing its principal consequence on those who
transgress its standard.")
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statute3 4 are graduated as to the several dealers and are not prohibitive.
The so-called tax under the second statute3 5 is not graduated, but applies alike to the smallest retailer of beer in the tiny hamlet and to the
largest wholesaler of liquor with the- whole state as his territory; and
it is, for most retailers at least, absolutely prohibitive. Furthermore
the taxes on the conduct of the business in violation of local laws are
not increased proportionately. The retail beer dealer has to pay fifty
times as much "tax" as is imposed where his occupation is lawful;
while the wholesale liquor dealer has to pay only ten times his original
tax. The heaviest burden falls upon the dealer whom Congress considered the least able to pay under the first statute.8 6 The great disparity between the tax on legal business and the further sum imposed
upon illegal business would seem to show the latter to be penal in its
nature although designated a "tax."'3 7 It seems from the language of
20 STAr. 333, 342 (1879), 26 U. S. C.A. §205 (1928), supra niote 2.
STAT. 95 (1926), 26 U. S. C. A. §206 (1928), spra note 3.
STAT. 333, 342 (1879), 26 U. S. C. A. §205 (1928), supra note 2. As stated

=44

3820

in the opening paragraph of this note, Congress placed different valuations on the
right to engage in the liquor business; the -wholesale liquor dealer -was required to
pay fivd times as much for his license as the retail beer dealer paid for his. If
Congress intended the levy under the second statute to be a tax, it seems that it
would have again recognized the difference in the scope of the several occupations.
Considering the two statutes together, the imposition of a lump sum in the second
clearly imports that it was designed to penalize the person who conducted his
business unlawfully.
'Helwig v. United States, 188 U. S. 605, 23 Sup. Ct. 427, 47 L. ed. 614 (1903),
This case involved an act imposing an additional "tax" equal to two per cent of
the appraised value of imported merchandise for each one per cent that such value
exceeded the valuation declared in the entry. The court, in holding that such an
imposition was a penalty and not a tax, said at page 613: "Although the sum
imposed by undervaluation may be simply described as a 'further sum' or an
'additional duty,' if it is yet so enormously in excess of the greatest amount of
regular duty ever imposed upon an article of the same nature, and it is imposed by
reason of the action of the importer, such facts clearly show it is a penalty in its
intrinsic nature, but describing it as a 'further sum' or 'additional duty,' wilt not
work a statutory alteration of the nature of the imposition, and it will be regarded
as a penalty when by its very nature it is a penalty. It is impossible, judging
simply from its language, to hold the provision to be other than penal in its
nature."
It is submitted that the statement just quoted is applicable to the $1000 liquor
tax in several respects, namely: this tax is in effect an "additional sum" imposed
upon dealers in dry states; it is "enormously in excess" of that imposed by the
first statute everywhere over the country; it is imposed "by reason of the action
of the" dealer in violating the local laws; and, in considering the language of
the tvo liquor tax statutes together, the $1000 imposition is "penal in its nature."
It is significant, though a court might not take notice of it, since it does not
so appear "on its face," that the $1000 tax was added in 1919 after Congress had
passed the Reed Amendment, 39 STAT. 1069 (1917), which made it a federal
offense to transport liquor into dry states, and after it had submitted the
Eighteenth Amendment for ratification.
The statute imposing the $1000 "tax" was in effect for such a short time before
Congress was authorized by the Eighteenth Amendment to regulate the intrastate
liquor traffic that the constitutionality of the act had not been tested until recently
following the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment. The courts in Constantine v.
United States,-F. (2d)-(C. C. A. 5th, 1935) and Green v. Page, 9 F. Supp.
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the act that this additional duty was laid for the purpose of enabling
Congress to regulate by taxes the intrastate liquor traffic, a power which
was withdrawn by the Twenty-first Amendment.
THroMAs H. LEATii.
Contracts-Adoption of Present and Future Laws therein.
In a mortgage the mortgagor declared "his assent to the passing of a
decree by the Circuit Court of Baltimore City . . . for a sale of the

property herein mortgaged in accordance with sections 720 to 723
inclusive of chapter 123 of the laws of Maryland passed at the January
session of 1898, or any amendments or additions thereto".' The mortgagee assigned to the plaintiff part of the mortgage debt, but less than a
one-fourth interest therein. Thereafter the legislature passed section
720A, 2 amending section 720 to the effect that during the emergency
period holders of less than a one-fourth interest in mortgage debts should
not have recourse to the summary remedies given under section 720.
Upon subsequent default by the mortgagor, the plaintiff petitioned for
relief under section 720, alleging that section 720A was unconstitutional, as impairing his contract rights and violating the equal protection clause. The judgment of the trial court, upholding both contentions
of the plaintiff, was affirmed by the Maryland Court of Appeals on the
basis of impairment of contract only. On appeal to the Supreme Court
of the United States, judgment was reversed on the theory that the
amendment did not impair the plaintiff's contract rights.8
The Maryland Court of Appeals took the position that assent of the
mortgagor to a decree as provided by section 720 "or any amendments
or additions thereto", did not amount to an agreement that the proceedings should be governed by "future amendments effective before application for the decree", but that the intention of the parties "embraced
only such amendments as had been made prior to the execution of the
mortgage". After quoting that argument, Justice McReynolds, for the
United States Supreme court, said, "Prior to the mortgage there had
been no such amendments, and it cannot be correctly said that the 'intention of the parties embraced only such amendments as had been made
prior to the execution of the mortgage'. On the contrary the words
844 (S. D. Ga. 1935) hold directly that the statute is a regulatory measure and
unconstitutional.
I Md. Laws 1898, c. 123, §720 (providing that where the mortgagor declared
his assent to such decree, upon the petition of the mortgagee or his assigns to
the named court, that court could issue such decree of sale and prescribe terms

for same).

'Md. Laws 1933, c. 56, §1.
' United States Mortgage Co. v. Matthews, 79 L. Ed. 191 (1934).

U. S. -, 55 Sup. Ct. 168,
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employed seem to us to embrace the amendments and additions thereafter made".
Problems connected with relief legislation, which this case suggests,
have been adequately discussed elsewhere. 4 The scope of this note will
be confined to the examination of questions raised by the express adoption into the mortgage contract of an existing statute and "any amendments or additions thereto".
As to law in existence when the contract is made, the familiar rules
may be briefly summarized. When the parties do not refer to it: (a)
All valid law applicable becomes a part of the contract ;5 (b) but that
is not true of unconstitutional law, even if such law specifically recites
that it is a part of contracts 6 to whidh it is made applicable. When the
parties do refer to it: (a) Express inclusion of valid law is unnecessary, since it applies anyway ;7 but express adoption of unconstitutional
law makes it a part of the contract, unless it was written therein merely
in compliance with mandatory provisions of the law, or unless it is
unenforceable because contrary to public policy.8 (b) An express
exclusion of valid law is of no effect if the attempt is to exclude substantive rules of contract,9 such as those relative to consideration; but
if the attempt is to exclude only laws of a non-mandatory nature, such
as procedural requirements, the intention of the parties will be given
effect.' 0 (c) Without going into the implications connected with Conflicts of Laws, it is pertinent to mention here the doctrine that parties
may successfully stipulate that their rights are to be governed by the
substantive law of another state or nation, unless their purpose is evasion
x
of their own state's laws."
However, as to law enacted after the execution of the contract, some
"On Retroactivity and Mortgage Relief Legislation, see: Notes (1934) 47
HARV. L. REV. 299 and 661; (1934) 28 ILL. L. REV. 830; (1934) 32 MIcE. L.
REV. 545; (1934) 12 N. C. L. REv. 363; (1934) 20 VA. L. REV. 122.
'Hood ex rel Bank of Summerfield v. Simpson, 206 N. C. 748, 175 S. E. 193
(1934); Knight v. Clinkscales, 51 Okla. 508, 152 Pac. 133 (1915); Lunati v.
Progressive Bld. and Loan Assoc., 167 Tenn. 161, 67 S. W. (2nd) 148 (1934).
'People v. Choler, 166 N. Y. 1, 59 N. E. 716 (1901); Palmer v. Tingle, 55
Ohio St. 423, 45 N. E. 313 (1896).
Cases cited supra, note (5).
'People v. Choler, 166 N. Y. 1, 59 N. E. 716 (1901); See: Palmer v. Tingle,
55 Ohio St. 423, 45 N. E. 313 (1896) ; City of Cleveland v. Clements Bros. Construction Co., 67 Ohio St. 197, 65 N. E. 885 (1902).
o See: Miller v. Thompson, 40 Nev. 35, 160 Pac. 775 (1916) ; Specht v. Collins,
81 Tex. 213, 16 S. W. 934 (1891) ; (both cases holding that an attempt to exclude
from a contract legal impossibility imposed by the law of the state was ineffective)
4 PAGE, CoNTPAcrs (2nd ed. 1920) §2049.
" Symser v. Fair, 73 Kan. 773, 85 Pac. 408 (1906) (allowing waiver of notice
otherwise required by law) ; William Lindeke Land Co. v. Kalman, 190 Minn. 601,
252 N. W. 650 (1934).
' 1Clark v. Gibbs, 69 F. (2d) 364 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934); Castleman v. Canal
Bank and Trust Co., - Miss. -, 156 So. 648 (1934).
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difficulty is encountered. When the parties do not refer to such law in
their agreement, ordinarily the rule is that only remedial measures become a part of their contract, 12 but that substantive enactments will not
operate retroactively to impair vested rights,' 3 apart from a valid exercise of the police power.' 4 But when there is an expression of mutual
assent by the parties to the adoption into the contract of an existing
statute and all amendments and additions thereto, there arises a problem
of construction relative to three specific fact situations:
First, there is the situation wherein amendments exist at the time of
the making of the contract, but no further ones are enacted before the
suit. Here, obviously the amendments form part of the contract, regardless of the express adoption, because they were valid law when the contract was made.15
Second, there is the situation wherein there are amendments existing
at the time of making the contract, and also new amendments passed
before the suit. Here, if it appeared that the parties knew or thought
amendments existed at the time of entering the agreement, it would
logically appear that their intention was to include only such additions,
since to include the new ones also would make their contractual rights
uncertain.' 6 It is submitted that in this situation the intention of the
parties should be given effect, and the application of the new amendments excluded, in spite of the fact that their expression of incorporation is literally broad enough to cover the new statutes. This contention
is based on the rule that though ordinarily contractual rights are determined strictly by expressions of agreement, 17 still, when the expressions
of agreement differ from the agreements intended by the' parties, courts
will often accept the interpretation of the parties, or rescind the contract.' 8
Third, there is the case in which there are no amendments in exis" Walker v. Whitehead, 83 U. S. 314, 21 L. ed. 357 (1872) ; Strand v. Griffith,

63 Wash. 334, 115 Pac. 512 (1911); See: 3 JONES,

MORTGAGES

(8th ed. 1928)

§1693.
'Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U. S. 118, 16 Sup. Ct. 1042, 41 L. ed. 93 (1895);
Hard v. State ex rel Baker, - Ala. -, 154 So. 77 (1934); See: 2 LEwis AND
SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (2nd ed. 1904) §660; 3 JoNEs, MORTGAGES
(8th ed. 1928) §1694.
1"See note (4) supra on Relief Legislation.
' Cases cited supra note (5).
" In reaching the result of the instant case, the court, by stressing the point
that "prior to the mortgage there had been no such amendments", indicates by
inference agreement with the contention made in the -text.
'Robinson v. Bowe, 73 F. (2d) 238 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935); Birk v. Jackson,
- Tex. Civ. App. -, 75 S. W. (2d) 918 (1934).
"Morgan v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 746 (Ct Cl. 1934); Cage v. Black,
97 Ark. 613, 134 S. W. 942 (1911) ; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Humphrey, 167
Tenn. 421, 70 S. W. (2d) 361 (1934); See: 3 WILISToN, CONTRACTS (1922)

§1541.
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tence when the contract is executed but amendments are enacted before
the bringing of the action. Here there are three possibilities: (1) If
from the circumstances, as unusual particularity of language in the
contract, it appeared that the parties knew there were no amendments
existing when they entered the agreement, it would seem that they did
intend to embrace the amendments enacted thereafter, since that would
be the only meaning of the language including amendments.' 9 (2) But
if there were not convincing indications of such knowledge, it would
seem that their intention was not to include future additions to the
statute, but only additions they thought might exist when the contract
was made, for the same reason as given in the second situation.2 0 (3)
But even if the parties knew there were no amendments to the statute
when the agreement was made, still if the future additions were so
sweeping as completely to change their agreement or work forfeitures, it
could not logically be said that they intended such amendment to be a
part of their contract, because it is not normal for parties to include in
their agreements such chances of losing rights for which they bargained. 21 Here again it is believed that the intention of the parties should
be given effect, so as to exclude the operation upon their contract of the
future statutes, both for the reason given in the second situation, and also
because the courts prefer a construction that makes the contract fair
22
and avoids a forfeiture.
In both the second and third situations, it is conceivable that for some
reason, such as opposite beliefs as to the existence of amendments at
the time of making the contract, one party might intend future additions
to apply to the contract, while the other party did not so intend. In
this case, aside from possible questions involving misrepresentation
resulting in erroneous belief as to the existence of amendments, or negligence of parties in signing express agreements, it is thought that the
clause purporting to adopt amendments, in so far as future additions
23
are concerned, should be without effect, because of misunderstanding.

J. L. CARLTON.
It seems that the principal case belongs in this category; and hence that it
properly represents one of the rare situations in which such expressions are
reliable indications of the intent of the parties to make future statutes a part
of their contract.
' See material cited supra, notes 16 and 18.
'For primary rules of interpretation, see: 2 WnsLISrON, CONTRACTS (1922)
§618 ("The writing will be read as a whole; and if possible it will be construed
so as to give effect to its general purpose").

Conway Co. v. Chicago, 274 Ill. 369, 113 N. E. 703 (1916) ; Flieschman v.
Furgeson, 223 N. Y. 235, 119 N. E. 400 (1918) ; Dumphrey v. Commercial UniQn
Assur. Co., 107 Tex. 107, 174 S. W. 814 (1915).
'Peerless Co. v. Pacific Crockery Co., 121 Cal. 641, 54 Pac. 101 (1898);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Humphrey, 167 Tenn. 421, 70 S. W. (2d) 361
(1934) ; Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 2 H. & C. 906 (Exch. 1864) ; See: 1 WMLrsToN,
CoNTRACTs (1922) §95.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
Criminal Procedure-Special Verdicts.
The defendant was indicted for the violation of an ordinance regulating the operation of taxi cabs, and by amendment at the trial the complete terms of the ordinance were incorporated in the warrant. The
jury returned a special verdict finding "that the defendant committed
the acts prohibited by the ordinance, as set out in the amendment to
the warrant". The trial court ruled that the ordinance was void and
adjudged the defendant not guilty. On appeal by the State the judgment was reversed on the ground that the special verdict was fatally
defective due to its failure to find the facts essential to an adjudication
of the defendant's guilt or innocence. 1
"A special verdict is that by which the jury find the facts only,
leaving the judgment to the court, ' 2 and in criminal cases the State may
8
appeal from a judgment of not guilty entered upon a special verdict.
It has been declared that the return of a general or a special verdict
is optional *ith the jury,4 but in the final analysis the trial court has
control of the "option," since it may refuse to accept a special verdict
and insist that the jury return a general verdict of guilty or not guilty. 5
However, if received, the special verdict is defective if a material finding
is omitted,0 if the findings are contradictory, 7 if the findings are merely
a statement of the evidence,8 or if the form of the verdict is otherwise
improper. 9 No judgment may be entered upon a verdict defective in
' State v. Gulledge, 207 N. C. 374, 177 S. E. 128 (1934). The trial court based
its decision upon the authority of a previous case, State v. Sasseen, 206 N. C.
644, 175 S. E. 142 (1934), in which this ordinance had been declared unconstitutional.
2
N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §585.
IN
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §4649. See State v. Lane, 78 N. C. 547
(1878) (rule before the statute was adopted). But cf. State v. Padgett, 82 N.
C. 544 (1880) (the state cannot appeal from a ruling of the trial court setting
aside a special verdict even though the court subsequently enters a judgment
of not guilty).
'See State v. Moore, 29 N. C. 228 (1847) ; State v. Holt, 90 N. C. 749, 47
Am. Rep. 544 (1884) ; State v. Stewart, 91 N. C. 566 (1884). See also the dissent
of Connor, J., State v. Leeper, 146 N. C. 655, 674, 61 S. E. 585 (1908) ("Again,
it is elementary that a defendant, after joining issue, is entitled to a general
verdict unless the jury of their own motion find a special verdict.").
'State v. Colonial Club, 154 N. C. 177, 69 S. E. 771 (1910).
'State v. Curtis, 71 N. C. 56 (1874) ; State v. Crump, 104 N. C. 763, 10 S. E.
468 (1889); State v. Bradley, 132 N. C. 1060, 44 S. E. 122 (1903); State v.
McCloud, 151 N. C. 730, 66 S. E. 568 (1909) ; State v. Barber, 180 N. C. 711,
104 S. E. 760 (1920).
"The special verdict must find unequivocally and explicitly all the material facts
that might warrant the court in adjudging the guilt or innocence of the defendant." State v. Yount, 110 N. C. 597, 15 S. E. 231 (1892). It is defective if the
court must supply a single fact or draw the slightest inference. State v. Bray,
89 N. C. 480 (1883) ; State v. Allen, 166 N. C. 265, 80 S. E. 1075 (1914).
'State v. White Oak River Corp., 111 N. C. 661, 16 S. E. 331 (1892).
I State v. Watts, 32 N. C. 369 (1849) ; State v. Hanner, 143 N. C. 632, 57
S. E. 154 (1907) ; State v. Fenner, 166 N. C. 247, 80 S. E. 970 (1914).
'A special verdict which does not include the following statement, or words
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any of these particulars, ° and the trial court may instruct the jury to
retire and correct the error, or it may grant a new trial."1 If the trial
court errs by entering judgment upon a defective verdict the appellate
court will order a venire de novo, 12 but if the court errs as a matter of
law in judging the defendant to be guilty or not guilty the case will be
remanded for the entry of the proper adjudication. 18 If the jury returns
a special verdict and fails to make a finding concerning one of several
offenses charged the court must declare the defendant not guilty on
4
that particular count.'
After the trial judge has decided whether the facts found by the
special verdict do or do not constitute the offenses charged it is not
necessary that he instruct the jury to render a verdict in accordance with
his decision, although such a procedure was once required and is not
now improper.' 5 It is sufficient that the judgment of the court be
entered upon the special verdict. Following a plea of not guilty the
submission of an agreed statement of facts, even with the consent of
the defendant's attorney, in order that the court without a jury might
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused is not proper,' 0 and
17
the decision of the court is not a special verdict.
In the principal case if the trial court had realized the inadequacy
to -the same effect, is defective in form: "If, upon said facts, the defendant is
guilty, the jury then finds him guilty.

jury finds him not guilty."

If, upon said facts he is not guilty, the

State v. Wallace, 25 N. C. 195 (1842) ; State v.

Stewart, 91 N. C. 566 (1884) ; State v. Divine, 98 N. C. 778, 4 S. E. 477 (1887).
But cf. State v. Scott, 142 N. C. 602, 55 S. E. 270 (1906).
" State v. Lowry, 74 N. C. 121 (1876) ; State v. Bray, 89 N. C. 480 (1883) ;
State v. McCloud, 151 N. C. 730, 66 S. E. 568 (1909).
U State v. Oakley, 103 N. C. 408, 9 S. E. 575 (1889).
' State v. Curtis, 71 N. C. 56 (1874) ; State v. Blue, 84 N. C. 807 (1881) ;
State v. Finlayson, 113 N. C. 628, 18 S. E. 200 (1893) ; State v. Barber, 180 N.
C. 711, 104 S. E. 760 (1920).
"' State v. Robinson, 116 N. C. 1047, 21 S. E. 701 (1895) ; State v. Ditmore, 177
N. C. 592, 99 S. E. 368 (1919); State v. Winston, 194 N. C. 243, 139 S. E.
240 (1927).
"4State v. Fisher, 162 N. C. 550, 77 S. E. 121 (1913).
' At one time it was considered a reversible error for the trial judge to fail to
instruct the jury to render a verdict in accordance with his decision of the defendant's guilt or innocence. State v. Stewart, 91 N. C. 566 (1884) ; State v. Morris,
104 N. C. 837, 10 S. E. 454 (1889) ; State v. Moore, 107 N. C. 770, 12 S. E. 249
(1890). However, this requirement has been overruled as superfluous, and it is
now proper for the court to enter the judgment upon the special verdict without
requiring a further verdict by the jury. State v. Ewing, 108 N. C. 755, 13 S.
E. 10 (1891); State v. Spray, 113 N. C. 686, 18 S. E. 700 (1893); State v.
Gillikin, 114 N. C. 832, 19 S. E. 152 (1894).
" The submission of an agreed statement of facts for determination by the court
sitting without a jury is a violation of the constitutional principle that in a crimimat case all facts must be found by -the jury. State v. Wells, 142 N. C. 590, 55
S. E. 210 (1906) ; State v. Allen, 166 N. C. 265, 80 S. E. 1075 (1914) ; State v.
Straughn, 197 N. C. 691, 150 S. E. 330 (1929).
" State v. Holt, 90 N. C. 749 (1884). But cf. State v. Davis, 159 N. C. 455, 74
S. E. 916 (1912) (for the purpose of the appeal the court treats the submission
of an agreed statement of facts as a special verdict).
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of the findings as a special verdict it might have considered their substance and very logically have treated them as a general verdict of
guilty. In which event the invalidity of the ordinance would have been
a proper basis for an arrest of the judgment.1 8 However, speaking
from authority rather than logic the decision of the principal case is
not open to criticism because the finding of facts was palpably insufficient to support any judgment.
As a device the special verdict has its defects and has been subjected
to attack. 19 The underlying theory of relieving the jury of applying
the law to the facts is good, but the technical requirements of exactness
and precision have caused trouble. 20 The favorable features of the
special verdict have been retained and the objections countered by the
procedure of submitting special interrogatories which the jury must
answer in addition to their duty of returning a general verdict. While
this development of the special verdict has been used extensively in civil
actions, it has met with approval in only a few criminal cases. 21 There
is a statute in North Carolina authorizing the use of these special questions in civil cases,2 but the Supreme Court has indicated an unfortunately hostile attitude toward their employment in criminal prosecu23
tions.

N. A.

TOWNSEND, JR.

' A convicted defendant may move to arrest judgment if the matter charged is
not a criminal offense. State v. Turner, 170 N. C. 701, 86 S. E. 1019 (1915).
Certainly the violation of an unconstitutional ordinance after it had been declared
void would not be a criminal offense.
The repeal of a statute pending a prosecution for an offense created under it
withdraws all authority to pronounce judgment, and a motion in arrest of judgment is proper. State v. Long, 78 N. C. 571 (1878); State v. Williams, 97 N. C.
455, 2 S.E. 55 (1887). By analogy the judicial decision that a statute is unconstitutional should have the same effect as the legislative action of repeal.
Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special (1920) 29 YALE L. J.253.

"At the bottom the special verdict represents a valuable idea, but as put

into operation it has no vitality. To require such excessive exactness of a lay
body, or even of lawyers, in the heat of trial, is to demand the impossible. Such
requirements cramped the life out of the special verdict." Green, A New Developmerit in Jury Trial (1927) 13 A. B. A. J.715, 716.
There are nearly sixty cases in the North Carolina Reports in which a special

verdict has been reversed because of some technical defect. Although it is prac-

tically impossible to ascertain the number of cases in which the special verdict

has been used successfully, the large number of reversals indicate that the percentage
of failure would be high.
" State v. McCarty, 210 Iowa 173, 230 N. W. 379 (1930); State v. Wells,
162 S. C. 509, 161 S. E. 177 (1931).
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §587SThe statute, N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §587, has never been con-

strued as applicable or not applicable to a criminal case, but in one opinion, in
speaking of special interrogatories, the court said, "This practice is not to be
advised in criminal cases. It will be found inconvenient and, moreover, it tends
to impair the undoubted rights of juries to find general verdicts, or at least to discourage its exercise." State v. Belk, 76 N. C. 10 (1877).
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Declaratory Judgments-Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts.
The first important question to arise under the recently enacted
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act' is one of jurisdiction. In the absence of express provision to the contrary, 2 it is generally held that
declaratory judgment acts do not enlarge a court's jurisdiction as to
parties and subject-matter of a suit.3 Jurisdiction is a preliminary matter to be determined according to prevailing rules. Thus if parties
of diverse citizenship are engaged in an actual controversy over property
exceeding $3,000.00 in value, such a case would be within a federal
court's jurisdiction 4 for purposes of a declaratory judgment suit. If
the value of the property is less than $3,000.00, it would not.8 Similarly,
if jurisdiction hinges on whether a given question is a "federal question,"
this ought to be decided in the affirmative 6 in order to be eligible for a
declaratory judgment.
A more difficult problem is presented when the question is admittedly a "federal question," arising under an Act of Congress, which
act, however, prescribes a special procedure. For example, a labor
union in Illinois sought a declaration of its rights under the famous
Sec. 7 (a) of the N.I.R.A.1 The N.I.R.A. provides that proceedings
to enforce the Act shall be instituted by or under the direction of the
Attorney-General. 8 The court dismissed the suit, holding that it was
without jurisdiction to entertain a private suit.0 The court relied upon
a similar construction of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law,'0 and upon
148 STAT. 955,28 U. S. C. A. §400 (1934).
2 The major provision of the federal statute merely declares, "In cases of actual
controversy the courts of the United States . . . shall have power to declare rights
and other legal relations of any interested party petitioning for such declaration,
whether or not further relief is or could be prayed." Declaratory Judgment Act,
supra
note 1.
8
BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (1934) 135 et seq.
'18 STAT. 470 (1875), 28 U. S. C. A. §41 (1927) ; General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Williams, 9 F. (2d) 165 (D. Mass. 1925); Home Life Insurance Co.
v. Sipp, 11 F. (2d) 474 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1926).
'Supra note 4.
818 STAT. 470 (1875), 28 U. S. C. A. §41 (1927) ; Hays v. Port of Seattle, 251
U. S. 233, 40 Sup. Ct. 125, 64 L. ed. 243 (1920) affiring 226 Fed. 287 (1915) ;
Miss. Power & Light Co. v. City of Jackson, 9 F. Supp. 564 (S. D. Miss. 1935)
(jurisdiction in suit for declaratory judgment denied because the subject matter
of the suit, an intrastate utilities rate controversy, had by statute been withdrawn
from federal jurisdiction).
'48 STAT. 198 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. §707 (a) (1934) (providing for collective
bargaining).
It shall be the
848 STAT. 196 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. §703 (c) (1934)
duty of the several district attorneys of the United States, under the direction of
the Attorney General, to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain
... violations.')
' Hary v. United Electric Coal Co., 8 F. Supp. 655 (E. D. Ill. 1934).
"8Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U. S. 459, 37 Sup. Ct. 718, 61 L. ed. 1256
(1916) (Petitioner sought to enjoin concerted action to prevent use of nonunionmade materials manufactured in other states. Suit dismissed, Justices McKenna,
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the assumption that Congress in enacting the N.I.R.A. must have
adopted that result."
A decision to the contrary was made in Michigan. Certain milk
distributors who were being harassed by administrative officials for
non-compliance with regulations promulgated under the A.A.A. sought
a declaratory judgment of their duties. The A.A.A. contains a provision similar to the N. I. R. A. and the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, providing that enforcement proceedings shall be instituted by the AttorneyGeneral.' 2 In this case the court, without discussing the question of
jurisdiction, ruled that the petitioner was entitled to a declaratory
judgment.' 3
These two cases may be distinguished in one respect. In the N.I.R.A.
case the petitioner was definitely seeking to determine what rights had
affirmatively risen by virtue of the act.' 4 In the A.A.A. case the petitioner, far from seeking to discover any right, was interested rather in
the negative aspect; that is, whether the law imposed any new duties
upon him. 15 However, in substance, the two petitioners were equally
interested parties seeking a declaration of legal relations created by a
federal statute.
Which case presents the preferable attitude? It is suggested that
there is a valid distinction between a suit in which the subject matter
and parties could never be within the federal jurisdiction and a suit
in which the whole problem hinges on an Act of Congress which admittedly would present a proper federal question if only the suit were
instituted by the Attorney-0eneral. Further, it is open to serious question whether a declaration of private rights is within the conception of
Congress as to what should constitute enforcement by the government.
At the time of the enactment of the Sherman Act, no such question
could have arisen for declaratory judgments were then unknowp
in America. The "New Deal" statutes raise a host of problems the
Pitney, Van Devanter, and McReynolds dissenting.) The Sherman Anti-Trust
Act, 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. A. §4 (1927), was amended in 1914, 38 STAT.
737 (1894), 15 U. S. C. A. §4 (1927), extending the right of injunctive relief to
private persons threatened with special damage.
Progressive Miners of America v. Peabody Coal Co., 7 F. Supp. 340 (E. D.
Ill. 1934). However, in Yarnell v. Hillsborough Packing Co., 70 F. (2d) 435
(C. C. A. 5th, 1934), the court entertained an injunction suit brought by citrus
fruit growers against an A. A. A. control board and denied relief on the merits
of the case without discussing the question of jurisdiction.
248 STAT. 37 (1933), 7 U. S. C. A. §610 (h) (1934).
Black v. Little, 8 F. Supp. 867 (E. D. Mich. 1934).
"Hary v. United Electric Coal Co., 8 F. Supp. 655 (E. D. Ill. 1934) (petitioner
sought to determine what new rights of collective bargaining had been granted
to labor under §7 (a) of the N. I. R. A.).
' Black v. Little, 8 F. Supp. 867 (E. D. Mich. 1934) (petitioner sought to
determine whether the A. A. A. required intrastate milk distributors to conform
to licensing requirements of A. A. A. boards.).
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solution of which may change the entire course of government and industry. If the N.I.R.A. or the A.A.A. is to be interpreted by any
court, that is, if any court ever has jurisdiction, it will be a federal
court. No one can be a more interested party than one whom the statutes and codes in express terms purport to affect. It is frequently said
that an interest in security, the preservation of social equilibrium, and
an avoidance of unnecessary disputes underlie the declaratory judgment acts. Therefore, when jurisdiction hinges on the question as to
who may sue under a given statute, it would seem more in keeping with
the appropriate social policy to hold a private suit sufficient for a
declaratory judgment.
HARRY W. McGALLIARD.
Evidence-Hearsay-Admissibility of Medical Records.
Plaintiff brought an action under a war risk policy to recover for
alleged total disability. The defense introduced evidence of a position
of employment formerly held by the plaintiff, and also a notation, made
by a physician, since deceased, upon the plaintiff's application for such
employment reading as follows, "Showing no disease with heart and
lungs o.k. application accepted". This latter was objected to as hearsay. Held, that the evidence was properly admitted as part of the res
gestae of plaintiff's applying for employment.1
The most common situation in which the admissibility of medical
records has been litigated is that involving medical history charts and
other records of hospitals. Such records, when containing communications made by a patient to his physician for the purpose of treatment,
are protected by the statutory physician-patient privilege, 2 even though
the records be kept pursuant to some legal requirement.3 However, once
'Jennings v. United States, 73 F. (2d) 470 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934).

'Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Trustees of Mich. Asylum
for the Insane, 178 Mich. 193, 144 N. W. 538 (1913) (writ of mandamus to
permit examination of the records of insane asylum denied); Price v. Standard
Life & Ace. Ins. Co., 90 Minn. 264, 95 N. W. 1118 (1903) (hospital records denied
admission as evidence) ; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Swain, 149 Miss. 455, 115
So. 555, 557 (1928) ("The records consisted of statements of the physician who
treated [insured] while a patient in the hospital. The relation of physician and
patient exists between the physician who has cause to make an examination and
diagnosis of him in a hospital, as well as outside of a hospital, or whether a pay
patient or charity patient, and such physician may not deliver his testimony so
acquired in open court or have it written down in so-called reports for consideration as evidence in contravention of our privileged communication statute.") ;
Toole v. Franklin Inv. Co., 158 Wash. 696, 291 Pac. 1101 (1930) commented upon
(1930) 5 TE.mp. L. Q. 300.
It should be noted that the privilege granted by the North Carolina statute is not
absolute. N. C. CODE Amr. (Michie, 1931) §1798 contains this proviso : "That the
presiding judge of a superior court may compel such a disclosure, if in his
opinion it is necessary to a proper administration of justice."
'Smart v. Kansas City,. 208 Mo. 162, 105 S. W. 709 (1907).
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this privilege has been waived, or found to be inapplicable to the case
in hand, there are various theories under which hearsay objections to
these records may be obviated. Clearly they are permissible for the purpose of refreshing the memory of a witness then in court, 4 or, when
failing to thus induce present recollection, may be admitted as past
recorded recollection, provided the witness can testify that the record
embodies his past perception and was correct when made. 5 Likewise,
when the recorder is dead, out of the jurisdiction, or otherwise unavailable, they are usually 6 held to be within the exception to the hearsay rule
for entries in the regular course of business.7 Furthermore, if, as is
'Generally see 2 WIGMopF, EVIENCE (2nd ed. 1923) §§758-765. Cf. Levy v.
Mott Iron Works, 143 App. Div. 7, 127 N. Y. S. 506 (1911) (physician's testimony
based upon hospital records inadmissible where he could not swear that they were

correct, and they did not refresh his memory).
'In re Hocks Will, 74 Misc. Rep. 15, 129 N. Y. S. 196 (1911) ; cf. Barfield
v. South Highland Infirmary, 191 Ala. 553, 68 So. 30 (1915) (admitted in malpractice action to show factors considered by defendant in prescribing treatment) ; Buck v. Brady, 110 Md. 568, 73 AtI. 277 (1909) (admitted in connection
with expert opinions). The ordinary rules governing the admissibility of past
recorded recollection would, of course, be applicable. These principles are discussed in 2 WiG.%ioRE, EvmENcE (2nd ed. 1923) §734 et seq.
' Due, perhaps, to the fact that hospital records were less complete and methodical formerly than now, some of the earlier cases indicate that their use should be
limited to that of refreshing the recollection of a witness then in court. Baird
v. Reilly, 92 Fed. 884, C. C. A. 2nd, 1899); McMahon v. Bangs, 5 Penn. 178,
62 Atl. 1098 .(Del. Super. 1904) ; National Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Cox, 174 Ky. 683,
192 S. W. 636 (1917); Griebel v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 95 App. Div. 214, 88
N. Y. S. 767 (1904); 'Harkness v. Borough of Swissvale, 238 Pa. 544, 86 Atl.
478 (1913) ; cf. Wright v. Upson, 203 Ill. 120, 135 N. E. 209 (1922) ; Kimber v.
Kimber, 317 Ill. 561, 148 N. E. 293 (1925).
' Boss v. Illinois Cent. R. R. Co., 221 Ill. App. 504 (1921) ; Ribas v. Revere
Rubber Co., 37 R. I. 189, 91 Atl. 58 (1914) ; cf. Chernov. v. Blakeslee, 95 Conn.
617, 111 Atl. 908 (1921) ("The hospital record, except as to -the dates of admission
and discharge . . . was not admissible as independent proof of the statements of
fact contained therein.") ; Richmond v. City of Norwich, 96 Conn. 582, 115 At. 11
(1921) (hospital bill admitted) ; Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry.,
138 N. C. 42, 50 S. E. 452 (1905) (train dispatcher's sheets admitted) ; Jones v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 148 N. C. 42, 62 S. E. 521 (1908) (freight conductor's report rejected). The persons who made the entries must be unavailable
as a witness. Cashin v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 185 Mass. 543, 70 N. E.
930 (1904) ; Delaney v. Framingham Gas Fuel & Power Co., 202 Mass. 359, 88 N.
E. 773 (1909) ; Osborne v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 87 Vt. 104, 88 Atl. 512 (1913).
The records must be properly authenticated, etc. Jordan v. Apter, 93 Conn. 302,
105 Atl. 620 (1919) ; State v. Trimble, 104 Md. 317, 64 Atl. 1026 (1906) ; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Dabudka, 232 Mich. 36, 204 N. W. 771 (1925).
But, in
this connection, it seems that the "ancient documents" rule is applicable. Inhabitants of Townsend v. Inhabitants of Pepperell, 99 Mass. 40 (1868) ; see In re
Barney's Will, 185 App. Div. 782, 174 N. Y. S. 242, 254 (1919). The fact that
the records are kept upon loose-leaf sheets or filing cards rather than in a bound
volume should not affect their admissibility. Matson Navigation Co. v. United
Engineering Works, 213 Fed. 293 (C. C. A. 9th, 1914) (workmen's time and
material cards admitted) ; Graham & Corry v. Work, 162 Iowa 383, 141 N. W.
428 (1913) (accounts kept by a system of sales tickets); Armstrong Clothing
Co. v. Boggs, 90 Neb. 499, 133 N. W. 1122 (1912) (loose-leaf ledger). But cf.
Hamilton v. Fusco Const. Co., 87 N. J. L. 62, 94 Atl. 50 (1915). It has been
held that opinions contained in such records will be excluded unless they are
those of persons who could qualify as expert witnesses. Paxos v. Jarka Corp.,
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increasingly the case, the records are kept in accordance with the requirements of a statute8 or municipal ordinance, under the majority rule they
may be admitted as "public documents". 9
But hospital records are usually composed of entries made by numerous doctors, nurses and interns during the course of the patient's illness. All of these entrants may be available to testify at the trial, and
if there is no statute entitling the records to admission under the "public
documents" exception, a party may be deprived of valuable evidence
unless he sees fit to summon a large portion of the hospital staff as
witnesses. The eminent reliability of these records, coupled with the
fact that such a course would not only involve increased costs of litigation, but seriously interfere with the hospital's daily routine as well,
appears to have formed the basis for a new exception to the hearsay rule
in a few jurisdictions. Legislative intervention has solved the problem
in some,' o 'but in a few others the courts seem to have sponsored the
exception. Occasionally this departure has been indicated by direct
language in judicial decisions,'. more often by an obviously liberal
2
attitude on the part of the court.'
314 Pa. 148, 171 At. 468 (1934) commented upon (1934) 19 ST. Lores L.

REV.

255.8

For example, Mo. REV. ST. (1929) §9056. Compare N. C. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1931) §7104.
'Galli v. Wells, 209 Mo. App. 460, 239 S. W. 894 (1922) (municipal ordinance); Shaw v. American Ins. Union, 33 S. W. (2d) 1052 (Mo. App. 1931)
(statute) ; Dallas Coffee & Tea .Co. v. Williams, 45 S. W. (2d) 724 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1932) ("bedside notes" in state hospital, statute required records to be
kept) commented upon (1932) 10 Txx. L. REv. 510; Hempton v. State, 111
Wis. 127, 86 N. W. 596 (1901) ; cf. Fondi v. Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co., 224 Mass.
6, 112 N. E. 612 (1916) (record of state board of health inadmissible as it was
not required -by statute) ; State v. Tarwater, 293 Mo. 273, 239 S. W. 480 (1922) ;
Laird v. Boston & M. R. R., 80 N. H. 58, 114 Atl. 275 (1921) (findings of board
of draft examiners inadmissible); Casey v. Kennedy, 52 D. L. R. 326 (New
Brunswick, 1920) (medical history sheet made out by medical board which
examined plaintiff for military service is admissible). So long as the records are
kept pursuant to a legal requirement, it should not be necessary that they be
open to public inspection. Casey v. Kennedy, supra.
For example, MASs. LAws ANN. (Michie, 1933) vol. 8, c. 233, §79 provides
that certain hospital records shall be admissible in evidence "so far as such records relate to the treatment and medical history of such cases; but nothing therein
contained shall be admissible as evidence which has reference to the question of
liability." This statute has been before the court in several cases. Raymond v.
Flint, 225 Mass. 521, 114 N. E. 811 (1917); Whipple v. Grandchamp, 261 Mass.
40, 158 N. E. 270 (1927) ; cf. Inangelo v. Petterson, 236 Mass. 439, 128 N. E. 713
(1920); Kelley v. Jordan Marsh Co., 278 Mass. 101, 179 N. E. 299 (1932). But
cf. Commonwealth v. Sacco, 255 Mass. 369, 151 N. E. 839 (1926).
'Globe Indemnity Co. v. Reinhart, 152 Md. 439, 137 Atl. 43 (1927); Mack
v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 53 S. W. (2d) 1108 (Mo. App. 1932);
St. Louis v. Boston & M. R. R., 83 N. H. 538, 145 Atl. 263 (1929). But cf.
Kirkpatrick v. American Creosoting Co., 225 Mo. App. 438, 37 S.W. (2d) 996
(1931). Professor Wigmore is a staunch advocate of such an exception. See
vol. 3 of his work on EviDENcE (2nd. ed. 1923) §1707.
'Lund

v. Olson, 182 Mhin. 204, 234 N. W. 310 (1931) ; Smith v. Missouri Ins.
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It is to be noted, however, that such an exception, if there be one,
should be strictly limited to hospital records. The necessity in that case,
i.e. the multiplicity of entrants, is not present in the case of the usual
physician's office records, notations of physicians examining applicants
for employment and the like. Nevertheless, in such cases the other
principles mentioned above are applicable,' 3 and the evidence in the
present case would seem to be admissible as an entry in the regular
4
course of business.'
JoEL B. ADAms.
Federal Procedure-Jurisdiction of Federal CourtsAppointment of Ancillary Receivers.
There is a firmly established rule that a federal court has jurisdiction
of an ancillary proceeding, regardless of the citizenship of the parties,
the amount in controversy, or any other factor that ordinarily would
determine jurisdiction, provided the court bad jurisdiction of the principal suit.1 In the case of Mitchell v. Maurer,2 the Supreme Court of
the United States raised two questions regarding the application of the
rule, which, it stated, did not appear to have been decided by that Court,
and which it declined to decide, as unnecessary to the disposition of the
problem presented. First-may the rule ever be applied to a proceeding
brought in the federal court of another district? Secondly-if so, is a
Co., 60 S. W. (2d) 730 (Mo. App. 1933) ; Pickering v. Peskind, 43 Ohio App.

401, 183 N. E.301 (1930).

Douler v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 143 App. Div. 537, 128 N. Y. S.
396 (1911) (records of doctors and nurses admitted as past recorded recollection) ; Adler v. New York Life Ins. Co., 33 F. (2d) 827 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929)
(office record of deceased physician admitted as regular entry) ; New York Life

Ins. Co. v. Bullock, 59 F. (2d) 747 (S. D. Fla. 1932) (physician's medical history

card admitted as regular entry) ; Royal Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Commission,
88 Colo. 113, 293 Pac. 342 (1930) (examining physician's report made in connection with laborer's application for employment admitted as regular entry) ; Leburn
v. Boston & M. R. R., 83 N. H. 293, 142 Atl. 128 (1928) (report of employer's
physician who examined plaintiff after former injury admissible as regular entry) ;
cf. Simmons v. Means, 8 Smedes & M. 397 (Miss. 1847) (physician's account book
admitted) ; Clark v. Smith, 46 Barb. 30 (N. Y. 1866) (physician's books admissible
to show number of calls made by him). A collection of cases bearing on the
admissibility of physician's records to show birth, death, etc. will be found in
Note L. R. A. 1915 F. 803. There seems to be a split of authority over the admissibility o.f physicians' death certificates. Cases on this point are collected in
Note (1922) 17 A. L. R. 359.
u It is not clear, however, upon what principle the evidence was admitted. The
following is quoted from the opinion: "The doctor's notations on the card were
admissible as a part of the res gestae of the plaintiff's application for work. They
were shown to have been made under circumstances making it reasonably apparent that they truly represented the facts they purported to set down. They are in
effect declarations by the plaintiff himself that he was fit and able to work."
73 F. (2d) at 473.
12 HUGHES, FEDERA PRocEnuRE (1931) §1192.
255 Sup. Ct. 162 (1934).

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
proceeding for the appointment of ancillary receivers in another federal
district an ancillary suit within the meaning of the rule?
In the principal case, primary receivers appointed by a state court
had petitioned for the appointment of ancillary feceivers in the federal
district court in another state. The Circuit Court of Appeals8 had
affirmed the appointment made by the District Court, remarking 4 that
"an ancillary suit in a federal court does not depend on diverse citizenship". The Supreme Court reversed the decree, on the ground that the
requisite diversity of citizenship was lacking,5 and stated that the position of the Circuit Court was unsound, in view of the fact that the
primary appointment was made by a state court. The opinion, however,
expressly recognizes the rule as applicable to proceedings in intervention,
and to independent suits which are ancillary to an original suit in the
same court. 6
It is to be noted that the questions raised refer to federal, not equity
jurisdiction,7 and are not coincidental with the question of the power
of a receiver to sue out of the district of his appointment.8
Statements such as that of the Circuit Court of Appeals apparently
find their origin in authority in a dictum of the Circuit Court of Appeals
in Bluefields S. S. Co. v. Steele.9 That dictum clearly answers both
questions raised by the Supreme Court in the principal case in the
affirmative. The Court said, "While an ancillary proceeding of the
kind here considered [a proceeding for the appointment of an ancillary
receiver] will be controlled by the court before which it is prosecuted,
and in that sense is an independent proceeding, its ultimate object is to
aid the purpose of the original suit, and in that sense it is ancillary.
Jurisdiction in such an ancillary suit therefore no more depends on
diversity of citizenship than it does in a suit ancillary to an original
suit pending in the same court." It will be noticed, however, that the
Court, during the course of its discussion of this point, cited but one
case'--one which does not support its proposition.
869 F. (2d) 233 (C. C. A. 9th, 1934). 'Id. at 238.
' One of the three primary receivers was a citizen of Delaware, as was the
defendant insurance company. This point was apparently relied upon at no stage
of the proceedings, but was looked to by the Supreme Court on its own motion.
655 Sup. Ct. 162, 164 (1934), citing Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Indianapolis,
etc., Ry. Co., 270 U. S. 107, 46 Sup. Ct. 221, 70 L. ed. 490 (1926), and White v.
Ewing, 159 U. S. 36, 15 Sup. Ct. 1018, 40 L. ed. 67 (1895).

'For cases illustrating aspects of the latter problem, see, for example, Bluefields S. S. Co. v. Steele, 184 Fed. 584 (C. C. A. 3d, 1911) ; Walker v. U. S. Light
&'Heating Co., 220 Fed. 393 (S. D. N. Y., 1915) ; Trustees System Co. of Pa. v.
Payne, 65 F. (2d) 103 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933).
' See Note (1906) 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 824; HIGH, REcntvEs (4th ed. 1910)
271-85.
'184 Fed. 584, 587 (C. C. A. 3d, 1911).
"Southern Ry. Co. v. Carnegie Steel Co., 176 U. S. 257, 20 Sup. Ct. 347,
44 L. ed. 458 (1900).
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On the other side is the decision in Winter v. Swuinburne.11 It was
there held that a creditors' bill could not be prosecuted in the circuit
court in aid of an execution on a money decree recovered in the district
court (in the same district) in admiralty, or for enforcement or collection of such a decree, all parties being citizens of the same state. The
Court based its conclusion upon the premise that the rule--that "where
a bill filed on the equity side of the court is not an original suit, but
ancillary and dependent, jurisdiction is maintained without regard to
the citizenship of the parties"-applied only where the ancillary bill
was filed in the same court. The cases cited by the Court were illustrative of the rule as applied to proceedings which were in fact in the
same court, but none of them required that the proceedings all be in
the same court. The opinion expressly admits that "direct adjudication
of the precise question involved is wanting."' 1 Since the facts are so
clearly distinguishable, we are again left with the bare, abstract proposition that the first question should be answered in the negative.
With such a paucity of judicial expression upon the problem, it
remains one requiring all the considerations of logic and policy attending
one of first impression. As to the second question, it is difficult to perceive why, if suits by and against a receiver, as such, in the court of his
appointment are ancillary,' 3 such suits in the court of another district
would be any the less So.14 Further, if, in order to maintain such
suits in a foreign district, ancillary appointment is necessary, 15 why
is not the petition for such appointment clearly ancillary to the purpose
of the principal action? To hold otherwise would be to put a new connotation upon the word itself.' 6 To that extent, the Court in the Bluefields Case would seem to be upon safe ground.
If the second question is to be answered in the affirmative, no very
cogent arguments present themselves for answering the first otherwise,
especially where the question involves courts of the same sovereign. An
action, having the requisite elements to give a federal district court
jurisdiction, can be brought as well in one district as in another, provided, of course, that the improper venue is waived. 17 If that is so,
either of-say-two district courts could take jurisdiction of the principal suit, and the one having jurisdiction of the principal suit would
8 Fed. 49 (C.C. E. D. Wis. 1881).

Id. at 52.

HIGH, RECEIVERS (4th ed. 1910) §§60a-b; 2 HUGHES, FEDERAL PROCEDURE
(1931) §§1205, 1208.
1 See Conklin v. U. S. Shipbuilding Co., 123 Fed. 913, 917 (C. C. Me. 1903).
312 HUGHES, FEDERAL PROCEDURE (1931) §1213.
1
BLAcK, LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933).
A well-established principle, impliedly recognized by the Court in the
principal case, 55 Sup. Ct. 162, 165 (1934). Also, 3 HUGHES, FEDERAL PROcEDURE
(1931) §2223.
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then have jurisdiction also of the ancillary proceedings, regardless of
the usual requisites for federal jurisdiction in the latter. In view of that
situation, would it not be a bit incongruous to hold that, if one district
court had jurisdiction of the principal suit, the other could not rely
upon that jurisdiction to sustain the ancillary proceedings brought
before it? Policy would seem to demand that the district courts stand
in readiness to aid one another without undue formality, and that, as
long as the system of equity receiverships exists, it be given every assistance to the speedy and efficient accomplishment of its purpose.' 8
D. W. MARKHAM.
Mortgages-Contract of Assumption-Consideration.
A certain E. C. Vest was heavily indebted to various persons. Some
of these creditors held first and second mortgages on two lots owned
by him; the rest were unsecured. In order to put this property beyond
the reach of the latter group, he conveyed it to his mother-in-law, Mrs.
Booth; and, apparently for the purpose of creating the appearance of a
sufficient consideration, she assumed the secured debts. She then reconveyed by warranty deed to her daughter, Mrs. Vest. The property
having been sold to satisfy a prior lien, the second mortgagee makes
claim in the present suit against Mrs. Booth's estate on the agreement of
assumption.' The West Virginia court held, the promise was without
consideration and hence unenforceable 2
Under this view of the transaction, Mrs. Booth was only a conduit,8 and the conveyance to her was merely a sham device to get title
' Compare §56 of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. A. §117 (1927), and REPORT
PAMPHLET No. 1: THE AssocIATIoN OF THE BAR OF THE CiTY OF NEW YORK
(1926-27), ANNUAL REPORT OF SPECIAL COmmITTEE ON EquITy RECEIVERSHIP,

19-31.

'The suit was originally brought in chancery by the receiver of a bank, which
held an unsecured claim reduced to judgment against Mrs. Booth, to set aside certain conveyances made by her to her children and children-in-lav on the grounds
that they were voluntary and made without consideration and to defraud and hinder
creditors. Pending this suit, Mrs. Booth died. Thereupon, her administrator was
substituted, and he made all of her heirs and all persons making claims against
the estate parties defendant. The appellee, a second mortgagee of the lots, was
made a party as one of the latter group. She answered by setting up the claim
against the estate in her cross-bill. Brief of Appellee in the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia in the case of Lawhead v. Booth, 177 S. E. 283 (W.
Va.2 1935) pages 2-5.
Lawhead v. Booth, 177 S. E. 283 (W. Va. 1935). The sole authority cited by
the court was 1 W.Lrso N, CoNTRACrs (1920) §394, which says that a promisor of
a third party beneficiary contract may set up want of consideration as a defense
to a suit by the beneficiary.
* The so-called "conduit" cases are, however, not in point. They deal with the
problem of the attaching of liens upon the property of the conduit. Stow v. Tifft,
15 Johns. 458 (N. Y. 1818) (Does dower attach to the interest of a purchase
money mortgagor?); Mills v. Van Voorhies, 20 N. Y. 412 (1859).
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seemingly based on good consideration into her daughter. 4 It was
never intended that she get the property, and so her promise to assume
was not based on any consideration. If this is the proper interpretation
to be put on the case, the court is correct; but the parties took an extremely dangerous means to accomplish their end, for there are other
equally logical conclusions which may be drawn from the facts.
Thus, the same line of reasoning used in considering the deeds as
constituting a single transaction might have led to the opposite result.
If Mrs. Booth were a person of some means,5 her purpose may have
been not only "to save" the lots, but also to help the Vests out of a
bad financial situation and to give her daughter control of the property.
If that were the state of facts, then even a deed made directly to the
daughter would furnish sufficient consideration.0 This is probably
consistent with the finding of fraud by the lower court, for the lots
would still have been put beyond the immediate reach of creditors without liens. Color is lent this view by the facts that only the mortgage
debts were assumed, that the mother-in-law gave a warranty deed, that
the deeds were made during the period of economic optimism in April
1928 when the land probably had some speculative value, and that Mrs.
Booth did not resist the claim in her lifetime.
There is, however, yet another method by which the estate could
have been held, even apart from the question of fraud. The deeds
might have been taken at their face value, that is that they were two
separate transactions. The mother-in-law, then, got the land in return
for her agreement to assume the debts and the fact that she later gave
it to her daughter would not alter the already binding contract. The
7
form of the instruments seems to make this the most obvious analysis.
Finally, the court might have reasoned that the plea of no consideration was substantially a setting up by Mrs. Booth of her own fraud.
The ostensible consideration for her assumption was the land. To say,
"For a discussion of defense available to a grantee of mortgaged realty who
assumes the debt see Note (1934) 12 N. C. L. REv. 383. In Boyd v. White,
65 Okla. 141, 164 Pac. 781 (1917), it was held, analogously, that an assumption
in a deed which created a resulting trust in -the grantor was not based on sufficient
consideration.
' This assumption is justified from a reading of the appellate briefs submitted
in the case and also from correspondence with counsel representing the parties.
'Riddle v. Hudson, 68 Okla. 172, 172 Pac. 921 (1919) ; 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACrS
(1920) §102 ("That a detriment suffered by the promisee at the promisor's request
is sufficient, though the promisor is not benefited is well settled") ; RESTATEmENT,
CONTRACTS (1932) §75 (2), ann. (1934) 13 N. C. L. REv. 41.
'This point is strongly urged by counsel for appellee in their petition for
rehearing dated Nov. 7, 1934. They contend therein that the reconveyance to Mrs.
Vest could not have been made at the same time as the original deed since it
refers to the volume and page of the Book of Deeds in which that conveyance
was recorded and that the second deed was a mere "pocket deed" to be used in
case of Mrs. Booth's death.
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therefore, that she did not get the land is to say in substance that she
held it to keep it away from Vest's creditors or that she immediately
conveyed it to her daughter for the same purpose. It is to be doubted
whether she should not be estopped to relieve herself of an obligation by
the use of such a plea.
The brief of the appellee-mortgagee reveals no less than six conveyances made by or to Mrs. Booth within some three years' time for the
sole purpose of defrauding and hindering her own or the Vests' creditors.8 In such a situation, created by the mother-in-law as well as the
Vests and participated in by the whole family, it would seem that any
doubts should be resolved in favor of the creditors.
On the court's interpretation of the facts, the result reached in the
principal case is defensible. It would not have been under other interpretations. The opinion does not adequately indicate the problems
involved.
PETER HAIRSTON.

Mortgages--Fiduciary Relationship of the Parties.
The defendant operated an automobile sales agency. He borrowed
money from the plaintiff acceptance company to purchase a car, delivering to the ompany his promissory note, a mortgage upon, and a bill
of sale to, the car, and a trust receipt. That document stated that the
defendant would hold the car in storage as the property of the company
and would not dispose of it until the note was paid. While in the
defendant's display room, the car was sold without the plaintiff's consent. The defendant failed to remit the purchase price; rather he
filed a petition in bankruptcy and received his discharge. The acceptance company had been listed as a creditor in the bankruptcy proceedings. Following the filing of the petition, this action for conversion
was instituted. The company contended that the defendant's acts came
within section 17(4) of the Bankruptcy Act,' which provides that discharge in bankruptcy does not release liabilities created by "fraud,
embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation while acting in any...
fiduciary capacity." Judgment was rendered for the defendant.'
It may be safely stated that the line of cleavage between those who
8

Brief filed on behalf of Elizabeth E. Keiffer, Appellee, in the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia in the case of Lawhead v. Booth et al., page 8.
- 11 U. S. C. A. 35 (4) (1927).
"Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., U. S., 79 L. ed. 137, 55 Sup. Ct. 151 (1934)
(The problem of whether the defendant had wilfully and maliciously injured

the plaintiff's property within the terms of subdivision two of the same sections
was also presented. The court decided that the evidence showed a technical but
not a malicious conversion); cf. In re Burchfield, 31 F. (2d) 118 (W. D. N. Y.
1929).
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are and who are not in a "fiduciary capacity" within the meaning of
the Bankruptcy Act is clear. That term applies only to expressed or'
technical trusts as contrasted to those situations where the courts imply
an obligation from the trust or confidence reposed in the debtor.2 It
is essential that the relationship exist before the debt from which the
cause of action arose was contracted.3 Thus it has been held that the
exception stated in the Act does not apply to a broker, 4 a partner, 5 a
mortgagor, 6 or, as in the principal case, to one who gave a trust receipt
upon a consignment of cars. 7 If a debtor who has posted security to
protect his creditor is not a fiduciary within the meaning of the exception, an interesting problem arises in determining just what, if any,
is the extent of the confidential relation existing between these parties.
Where the debtor wrongfully disposes of the security, the injured
creditor has a right of action against him.3 He may even follow the
proceeds derived from the sale as long as they can be definitely identified and have not passed into the hands of a bona fide purchaser for
value.9 Though these remedies are settled, there exists some dispute
as to the theory upon which they are based. In a leading case in
Maine,10 it was said that "the Law imputes a trust in the mortgagor."
That the application of such a doctrine to the problem under discussion
is unnecessary is shown by a more recent decision from Wyoming."
There the same result was obtained by treating the mortgagor as an
agent of the mortgagee. Still other courts have held that while in using
the security in the ordinary course of business the mortgagor is no
trustee, he is under a duty to preserve that security intact.12
Correspondingly, the courts are faced with the same difficulty of
nomenclature in determining the reverse situation-the nature of a credi'Chapman v. Forsythe, 69 U. S. 202, 11 L. ed. 250 (1844); In re Harber,
9 F. (2d) 551 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925).
1Upshur v. Briscoe, 138 U. S. 365, 11 Sup. Ct. 313, 34 L. ed. 931 (1891);
Clair v. Colmes, 245 Mass. 281, 139 N. E. 519 (1923).
'In re Codman, 284 Fed. 273 (D. Mass. 1922).
GIn re Frazzetta, 1 F. Supp. 122 (W. D. N. Y. 1932); Karger v. Orth, 116
Minn. 124, 133 N. W. 471 (1911).
' Bryant v. Kenyon, 127 Mich. 152, 86 N. W. 531 (1901). But cf. Johnson v.
Worden, 47 Vt. 457 (1874); Darling v. Woodward, 54 Vt. 101 (1881) (where a
different result was reached. However, in neither of these cases does it appear
within which specific exception to the Bankruptcy Act the defendant was
included.)
Bloomingdale v. Dreher, 31 F. (2d) 93 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929).
8 Davis v. Virginia Ry. & Power Co., 229 Fed. 633 (C. C. A. 4th, 1915).
' Columbia Basin Wool Warehouse Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Fairchild, 290
Fed. 260 (D. Idaho 1923) ; First Nat. Bank of Auburn v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 108 Me. 79, 76 Atl. 4 (1911) ; cf. Texas Moline Plow Co. v. Kingman
Texas Implement Co., 32 Tex. Civ. App. 343, 80 S. W. 1042 (1904) (where the
question of what constitutes identification is discussed).
10 McLarren v. Brewer, 51 Me. 402 (1863).
" Thex v. Shreve, 38 Wyo. 285, 267 Pac. 92 (1928).
"Da-is v. Virginia Ry. & Power Co., 229 Fed. 633 (C. C. A. 4th, 1915).
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tor's duty toward his debtor. Here, however, a greater number of cases
have arisen than in the above situation; thus one has the benefit of the
added judicial expression. Roughly the decisions may be divided into
two classes: Those that arise in states which treat the mortgagee as
having a mere lien upon the debtor's property; and those which hold
that the giving of a mortgage transfers legal title to the mortgagee. In
North Carolina, which is within the latter class, the mortgagee is deemed
to hold the legal title in trust for the mortgagor. 13 Except for taldng
possession of the property and the institution of foreclosure proceedings on default, he is permitted to do no act detrimental to his debtor's
interest.14 Thus it has been held that he may not extinguish the mortgagor's equity of redemption by a purchase of the security at a tax
sale, 15 or at a foreclosure of either a prior encumbrance,' 6 or his own
mortgage. 17 Nor may he contract to acquire his debtor's equity of
redemption without assuming the burden of showing that the transaction
was fair.' s At least one other state that accepts the "title" theory is in
accord. 19 A different principle is advanced in those states that consider
the mortgagor as having legal title to the security, 20 although even
here it has been held that the mortgagee is a trustee. 21 That doctrine
was aptly stated in a case arising in New York, 22 where it was said
Taylor v. Heggie, 83 N. C. 244 (1880).
McLeod v. Bullard, 86 N. C. 210 (1882).
Cauley v. Sutton, 150 N. C. 327, 64 S. E. 3 (1909).
"Taylor v. Heggie, 83 N. C. 244 (1880).
17 Dawkins v. Patterson, 87 N. C. 384 (1882) ; Warren v. Susman, 168 N. C.
457, 84 S. E. 760 (1915).
' Pritchard v. Smith, 160 N. C. 79, 75 S. E. 803 (1912) ; Cole v. Boyd, 175
N. C. 555, 95 S. E. 77 (1918).
Stebbins v. Clendenin, 136 Ark. 391, 206 S. W. 681 (1918). Contra, Lee v.
Fox, 113 Ind. 98, 14 N. E. 889 (1888).
'Waterson v. Devoe, 18 Kan. 223 (1877) (where the mortgagee was purchaser at a tax sale) ; Threlkeld v. Walker, 141 Ky. 737, 133 S. W. 772 (1911)
(where the mortgagee became assignee of a purchaser at the foreclosure of a
prior lien); Holliday v. McGraw, 101 Misc. Rep. 661, 176 N. Y. S. 661 (1919)
(where the mortgagee's agent sold part of the security on credit) ; Bailey v.
Frazier, 62 Ore. 142, 124 Pac. 643 (1912) (where creditor bought debtor's equity
of redemption) ; see Hennequin v. Clews, 111 U. S. 676, 682, 28 L. ed. 565, 4 Sup.
Ct. 576, 579 (1883).
Block Motor Co. v. Melia, 247 S. W. 666 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
'Ten Eyck v. Craig, 62 N. Y. 406, 421 (1875) (continuing on page 422, the
court stated the principle to be this: "A mortgagee is often called a trustee, and
in a very limited sense this character may be attributed to him. There may be a
duty resting upon a mortgagee in possession to discharge a particular claim against
the land. If in such a case he omits to do it, and allows the land to be sold on
such a claim, and becomes the purchaser, he would hold the title in trust for the
mortgagor. A mortgagee in possession is allowed, and it may be his duty to pay
the taxes on the land out of the rents and profits. If he suffers the land to be
sold for taxes in violation of his duty, and purchases at the sale, he would upon
general principles be deemed to hold title as trustee. . . . A mortgagee in possession
is bound to account for rents and profits; and in that respect . . . he may be
denominated a trustee. But, except in some special sense, that is not the relation
he bears to the mortgagor."
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that "There is, in truth, no relation analogous to that of trustee and
cestui que trust between the mortgagor and mortgagee created by the
execution of the mortgage. The mortgagee is not a trustee of the legal
title because, under our law, he has no title whatever.... He may deal
with the mortgagor, in respect to the mortgaged estate, upon the same
footing as any other person; he may buy in encumbrances for less than
their face, and hold them against the mortgagor for the full amount;
he may do what any other person may do, and his acts are not subject
to impeachment simply because he is mortgagee."
It may be admitted that both parties occupy a fiduciary relationship
toward each other in the sense that each owes the duty of using reasonable means to protect the other's interest; yet to make the unqualified
statement that one party is a trustee for the other seems to be grafting
upon the law of trusts an extension that may prove dangerous. Is it not
both safer and more accurate to say that, like principal and agent, the
mortgagor and mortgagee are bound to act fairly in respect to each other
and to the property in which they are mutually interested? If the terms
trustee and cestui que trust must be used to denote the relationship, it
should always be remembered that they are not being applied in their
technical sense.
EMMETT C. WILLis, JR.
Mortgages-Suretyship where Grantee of Mortgagor
Assumes Mortgage Debt
The maker of a bond secured by a mortgage sold the mortgaged
premises, his grantee assuming payment of the bond. Thereafter the
mortgagee dealt directly with the grantee, receiving partial payments on
the bond, and agreeing to an extension of time thereon without the
mortgagor's consent. In a suit on the bond by the mortgagee against
the mortgagor, held, as between the mortgagee and the mortgagor the
character of the latter was not changed from principal to surety by the
fact that his grantee "assumed" the mortgage. The mortgagor was
therefore not discharged by the extension of time granted without his
consent by the mortgagee to the grantee.1
Where the grantee "assumes" the mortgage debt it is generally held
that he becomes personally liable therefor. 2 As a corollary to this
ICommercial National Bank of Charlotte v. Carson, 207 N. C. 495, 177 S. E.
335 (1934). This case proceeds upon the authority of Brown v. Turner, 202 N. C.
227, 162 S. E. 608 (1932), noted in (1932) 11 N. C. L. REv. 96.
2Keller v. Ashford, 133 U. S. 610 10 Sup. Ct. 494, 33 L. ed. 667 (1889);
2 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) §934. This liability may be based upon either
of two theories: first, that the mortgagee is subrogated to the rights of the mortgagor; or second, that the mortgagee, as a third party beneficiary, may sue the
grantee directly. N. C. now allows a suit under either theory. Rector v. Lyda,
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proposition, the great majority of cases hold that while the mortgagor
is not released, still if the mortgagee recognizes the liability of the
grantee at all, then he must also recognize that the liability of the original
mortgagor has become "secondary" and that a suretyship relation has
arisen.3 In jurisdictions adopting this view, if the mortgagee and the
grantee deal with the property so as to injure the mortgagor without his
consent, he is released wholly 4 or at least pro tanto to the extent of his
injury. 5 This result is based upon the familiar principle of suretyship
that the creditor must do no act without the surety's consent which will
impair the rights of the surety upon pain of releasing the latter.0 Thus,
a binding extension of time granted by the mortgagee to the grantee
operates to discharge the mortgagor 7 unless the extension is assented
to by the mortgagor,8 or unless the rights of the mortgagee against the
mortgagor are expressly reserved. 9 If the mortgage debt is evidenced
by a negotiable instrument, then some jurisdictions which adopt the
majority view as to the creation of a creditor-surety relationship hold
180 N. C. 577, 105 S. E. 170 (1920); Parlier v. Miller, 186 N. C. 501, 119 S. E.
898 (1923) ; Keller v. Parrish, 196 N. C. 733, 147 S. E. 9 (1929) ; Coxe v. Dillard,
197 N. C. 344, 148 S. E. 545 (1929) ; Notes (1922) 21 A. L. R. 439; (1927) 47
A. L. R_ 339.
'Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Hanford, 143 U. S. 187 12 Sup. Ct. 437, 36 L. ed.
118 (1891); Smith v. Davis, 67 Colo. 128, 186 Pac. 519 (1920); Blumenthal v.
Serota, 129 Me. 188, 151 Atl. 138 (1930) ; Calvo v. Davies, 73 N. Y. 211 (1878)
see White v. Augello, 142 Misc. Rep. 233, 254 N. Y. S. 228 (1931).
'Blumenthal v. Serota, 129 Me. 188, 151 Atl. 138 (1930) ; United States
Bldg. and L. Asso. v. Burns, 90 Mont. 402, 4 P. (2d) 703 (1931) ; Bank of Rochester v. Scanlon, 146 Misc. Rep. 695, 262 N. Y. S. 790 (1933) (three day extension
of time released mortgagor in toto from liability on a bond for $170,000).
'Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Lindley, 183 N. E. 127 (Ind. App. 1932);
Travers v. Dorr, 60 Minn. 173, 62 N. W. 269 (1895); Zastrow v. Knight, 56
S. D. 554, 229 N. W. 925 (1930).
'Miller v. Stewart, 22 U. S. 680, 6 L. ed. 189 (1824). In Rees v. Berrington,
2 Ves. Jr. 540 (Ch. 1795) the principle is stated thus: "It is the clearest and most
evident equity not to carry on any transaction without the privity of him (the
surety) who must necessarily have a concern in every transaction with the principal debtor." 1 BRANDT, SuRETYSHiP (3rd ed. 1905) §376; 2 WILLISTON, CONTRAcTs (1920) §1222.
"Fischer v. Boller, 227 Mo. App. 52, 51 S. W. (2d) 141 (1932); Bank of
Rochester v. Scanlon, 146 Misc. Rep. 695, 262 N. Y. S. 790 (1933) ; Wright v.
Bank of Chattanooga, 166 Tenn. 4, 57 S. W. (2d) 800 (1933) ; Gillman v. Purdy,
167 Wash. 659, 9 P. (2d) 1092 (1932); see Hamilton Co. v. Rosen, 53 R. I.
346, 166 At. 691 (1933). To effect a discharge of the mortgagor, he must show
that at the time of granting the extension the mortgagee had actual knowledge
that the grantee had assumed the mortgage. Mississippi Valley Trust Co, v.
Bussey, 49 F. (2d) 881 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931) ; Chilton v. Brooks, 72 Md. 554, 20
Atl. 125 (1890) ; Erickson v. Todd, 252 N. W. 879 (S. D. 1934).
' Burden of showing assent by the mortgagor rests on the mortgagee. Burgess
v. Ohio Nat. Life Ins. Co., 48 Ga. App. 260, 172 S. E. 676 (1934).
'A reservation of rights against the surety is effectual to prevent his discharge
because it is construed as preserving to him all his rights against the principal
obligor unimpaired. Hodges v. Elyton Land Co., 109 Ala. 617, 20 So. 23 (1895);
Meredith v. Dibrell, 127 Tenn. 387, 155 S. W. 163 (1913).
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that the provisions of the N. I. L. apply so as to prevent the mortgagor
maker of the instrument from being discharged.10
However, a few courts follow the view of the principal case and
hold that as between the mortgagee and the mortgagor no creditorsurety relationship arises. 1 The logical result of this holding is that
no subsequent dealings between the mortgagee and the grantee, such as
an extension of time on the debt, can have the effect of discharging
12
the mortgagor.
In the principal case the court intimated that its judgment did not
preclude the mortgagor, who had been compelled to pay, from recovering over against the grantee. If this means that the mortgagor may hold
3
the grantee immediately and before the extension of time has expired,'
then obviously the grantee has been cut out of the benefit of the extension agreement for which he' has given valuable consideration. 14 On
the other hand, if the mortgagor may not recover over against the
grantee until after the extension of time has expired, then he is being
held to an extension agreement to which he never assented and to which
he was not even a party ;15 meanwhile the grantee may have gone bank"Peter v. Finzer, 116 Neb. 380, 217 N. W. 612 (1928) (maker of note who
was by its terms unconditionally bound to pay was primarily liable under section
192 of N. I. L. Section 119, which provides for discharge of a negotiable instrument, and so for discharge of one primarily liable thereon, does not provide for
any discharge by an extension of time); Washer v. Tontar, 128 Ohio St. 111,
190 N. E. 231 (1934) ; Sloan v. Gates, 166 Tenn. 446, 62 S. W. (2d) 52 (1933) ;
Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v. Carter, 165 Tenn. 628, 57 S. W. .(2d) 449 (1933);
Continental Mut. Say. Bank v. Elliott, 166 Wash. 283, 6 P. (2d) 638 (1932);
cf. Finzer v. Peter, 120 Neb. 389, 232 N. W. 762 (1930); Wright v. Bank of
Chattanooga, 166 Tenn. 4, 57 S. W. (2d) 800 (1933). Contra: Stapler v. Anderson, 177 Ga. 434, 170 S. E. 498 (1933) ; Burgess v. Ohio Nat. Life Ins. Co., 48
Ga. App. 260, 172 S. E. 676 (1934); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Bass, 257
I1. 72, 191 N. E. 284 (1934); Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Lindley, 183 N. E.
127 (Ind. App. 1932); Jefferson County Bank v. Erickson, '188 Minn.
354, 247 N. W. 245 (1933); Zastrow v. Knight, 56 S. D. 554, 229 N. W. 925
(1930). Blocki, Is Mortgagor's Liability Extinguished by Extension of Time of
Paywnent Without His Consent? (1932) 11 CHICAGO-KENT Rev. 1; Note (1933)
19 VA. L. REv. 618.
u Pfeifer v. W. B. Worthen Co., 74 S. W. (2d) 220 (Ark. 1934) ; Boardman
v. Larrabee, 51 Conn. 39 (1883) ; Iowa Title and Loan Co. v. Clark Bros., 209
Iowa 169, 224 N. W. 774 (1929) ; Bradstreet v. Gill, 22 N. M. 202, 160 Pac.
354 (1916).
1 Wolfe v. Murphy, 47 App. D. C. 296 (1918) ; Denison University v. Manning,
65 Ohio St. 138, 61 N. E. 706 (1901) ; Brecht v. Bialas, 19 Pa. Dist. R. 664 (1910).
1 That the mortgagor may sue immediately, see: Iowa Title and Loan Co. v.
Clark Bros., 209 Iowa 169, 224 N. W. 774 (1929) ; Denison University v. Manning,
65 Ohio St. 138, 61 N. E. 706 (1901).
U If
there had been no consideration for the extension agreement, then the
mortgagor would not be released at all, since in no jurisdiction does mere indulgence given by the mortgagee to the purchaser have this effect. Boardman v.
Larrabee, 51 Conn. 39 (1883); Olmstead v. Latimer, 158 N. Y. 313, 53 N. E. 5
(1899) ; Erickson v. Todd, 252 N. W. 879 (S. D. 1934) ; Gillman v. Purdy, 167
Wash. 659, 9 P. (2d) 1092 (1932).
N o case has been found in which the mortgagor was held liable and at the
same time was denied immediate rights over against his grantee. It is to be noted,
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rupt, rendering the delayed remedy ineffectual. Thus, whatever happens,

one or the other party must lose a valuable right. This dilemma seems
unavoidable under the holding of the principal case that no surety relationship arises. In view of this difficulty, and since there is North
Carolina authority flatly contra to the principal case, 16 it is suggested
that North Carolina should reverse its present position on this point
1
so as to follow the majority view and its own previous holding. 7

F. M. PARKER.
Negligence-Infant Trespassers-the Attractive
Nuisance Doctrine.
The plaintiff's eight year old girl wandered onto a cement walk
across defendant's bridge and, while dropping rocks from a pile of
crushed stone on the bridge into the water below, fell off and was
drowned. Several small children lived in a mill settlement nearby.
A nonsuit was affirmed on the grounds that infants are as essentially
trespassers as adults and may not recover under the attractive nuisance
doctrine unless the facts are sufficient to impose the duty of anticipation
or prevision. 1
But in another case decided the same day the court held that the
defendant should reasonably have anticipated that small children would
be attracted to and injured by his property where the plaintiff's two
infant children were drowned in an unguarded, abandoned cistern or
reservoir around and in which children had been accustomed to play
2
and fish for a number of years.
The doctrine of attractive nuisance is an exception to the general
rule that a landowner is not responsible to a trespasser for a condition
however, that the majority view, according to which the mortgagor is released
from liability to the mortgagee, goes upon the assumption that by granting the
extension of time the mortgagee has put it out of the power of the mortgagor to
have the same remedy over he would have had but for such extension. See
Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Bussey, 49 F. (2d) 881 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931).
' Hamilton v. Benton, 180 N. C. 79, 104 S. E. 78 (1920) (while a chattel
mortgage was involved here, no reason is seen why this should justify a distinction between this and the principal case. However, the result of this case was also
placed upon another ground.)
'7This might be effected by a statute somewhat as follows: Whenever any
real or personal property incumbered by a mortgage shall be conveyed subject to
such mortgage, and in such conveyance there shall be a provision that the grantee
shall assume and pay such incumbrance, if the holder of the mortgage thereafter
recognizes the liability of the grantee to him, by accepting 'payments on the mortgage debt or otherwise, then, as against such holder of the mortgage, the grantee
shall be considered the principal debtor and the mortgagor or intermediate grantee
who may likewise have assumed the mortgage shall be considered a surety.
'Boyd v. Atlanta S. C. A. L. R. Co., 207 N. C. 390, 177 S. E. 1 (1934).
2 Brannon v. Sprinkle, 207 N. C. 398, 177 S. E. 114 (1934).
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of the premises. 3 Liability has been based on two theories :4 (1) general negligence of the landowner where the attractive instrumentality is
so dangerous as to impose the duty of anticipating some injury from
leaving it unguarded 5 (all the North Carolina cases lie in this group) ;6
and (2) an invitation to enter the premises implied from the allurement. 7 Several requirements are necessary to establish liability under
this latter theory: (a) the object must be unusually attractive to children of tender years ;8 (b) the thing must be on defendant's own land ;9
8
Loftus v. Dehail, 133 Cal. 214, 65 Pac. 379 (1901) ; Kramer v. Southern R.
Co., 127 N. C. 328, 37 S. E. 468 (1900); CooT-Y, TORTS (3rd ed. 1906) 1258,
1268.
' Some jurisdictions have refused, however, to recognize the doctrine at all:
Savannah, F. & W. R. Co. v. Beavers, 113 Ga. 398, 39 S. E. 82 (901) ; Kidder v.
Sadler, 117 Me. 194, 103 At. 159 (1918) ; State v. Machen, 164 Md. 579, 165 Atl.
695 (1933); Ryan v. Tower, 128 Mich. 463, 87 N. W. 644 (1901); Frost v.
Eastern R. R., 64 N. H. 220, 9 Atl. 790 (1887) ; Hockstein v. Congregation Talmud
Torah Sons etc., 144 Misc. Rep. 207, 258 N. Y. S. 479 (1932); Filer v. McNair,
158 Va. 88, 163 S. E. 335 (1932); Addie & Sons v. Dumbreck, (1929) A. C.
358.
Sioux City S. Pac. R. R. Co. v. Stout, 84 U. S. 657, 21 L. ed. 745 (1873);
Rataz v. N. Y. Eskimo Pie Corp., 73 F. (2d) 184 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1934); Clark v.
Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 118 Cal. App. 344, 5 P. (2d) 58 (1931); Stark v.
Holtzclaw, 90 Fla. 207, 105 So. 330 (1925); Peters v. Pierce, 146 La. 902, 84
So. 198 (1920) ; Ann Arbor R. Co. v. King, 68 Ohio St. 210, 67 N. E. 479 (1903) ;
Gilmartin v. City of Philadelphia, 201 Pa. 518, 51 Atl. 312 (1902); Whirley v.
Whiteman, 38 Tenn. 610 (1858) ; RESTATEmENT, TORTS (1934) §330 comments to
(a), (b).
'Kramer v. Southern R. Co., 127 N. C. 328, 37 S. E. 468 (1900) ; Briscoe v.
Henderson Lighting & Power Co., 148 N. C. 396, 62 S. E. 600 (1908); Ferrell
v. Dixie Cotton Mills, 157 N. C. 528, 73 S. E. 142 (1911); Starling v. Selma
Cotton Mills, 168 N. C. 229, 84 S. E. 388 (1915); Comer v. Winston-Salem, 178
N. C. 383, 100 S.E. 619 (1919).
"United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt, 258 U. S. 268, 42 Sup. Ct. 299, 66
L. ed. 615 (1922) ; Best v. Dist. of Columbia, 291 U. S. 411, 54 Sup. Ct. 487,
78 L. ed. 882 (1934) ; Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Kilpatrick, 185 Ark. 678,
49 S. W. (2d) 353 (1932); Howard v. City of Rockford, 270 Ill. App. 155,
(1933) ; Biggs v. Consolidated Barbwire Co., 60 Kan. 217, 56 Pac. 4 (1899).
8 Clark v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 114 Cal. App. 344, 5 P. (2d) 58 (1931);
Peters v. Pearce, 146 La. 902, 84 So. 198 (1920) ; Walsh v. Fitchburg R. Co., 145
N. Y. 301, 39 N. E. 1068 (1895); Flippen Prather Realty Co. v. Mather, 207
S. W. 121 (Tex. Civ. App., 1918). The children must be of tender years, but no
age has been determined at which the court can say as a matter of law that the
doctrine is applicable; Central of Ga. R. R. v. Robins, 209 Ala. 6, 95 So. 367
(1923). Various courts have held that the child must be: (a) below the age of
puberty, Central of Ga. R. R. v. Robins, mtpra: (b) below the age of 14, Lipscomb v. Cincinnati, N. & C. St. R. Co., 238 Ky. 572, 39 S. W. (2d) 465 (1931) ;
(c) of such a tender age as not to appreciate -the danger of her acts, Loftus v.
Dehail, 133 Cal. 214, 65 Pac. 379 (1901); or that it is a question for the jury
to decide whether the doctrine applies to the individual child; Biggs v. Consolidated Barbwire Co., 60 Kan. 217, 56 Pac. 4 (1899).
'Kramer v. Southern R. Co., 127 N. C. 328, 37 S. E. 468 (1900) ; RESTATEmENT,
TORTS (1934) §339. The attractive nuisance doctrine was developed essentially
to protect children trespassing on the property of another, but the doctrine has,
in some cases, been extended to cover any object which might reasonably be
expected to lure infants to their injury. See Rataz v. N. Y. Eskimo Pie Corp.,
73 F. (2d) 184 (C. C. A. 3rd., 1934) (playing with dry ice) ; Kansas City, Ft.,
S. & M. R. Co. v. Matson, 68 Kan. 815, 75 Pac. 503 (1904) ; Harper v. Kapp, 24
Ky. Law Rep. 2342, 73 S. W. 1127 (1903); Ramsey v. Nat. Contracting Co., 49
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(c) the children must be lured onto the land by the dangerous instrumentality itself ;1o (d) the danger must be latent;" (e) it must be practical to guard the thing without great expense or inconvenience to the
owner; 12 (f) the condition must be artificial in some jurisdictions, and a
few have refused to apply the doctrine to any body of water, whether
artificial or not.13
It seems obvious that the idea of implied invitation is based on a
fiction, both of law and of fact, and a fiction which cannot be given its
full logical extension. 14 The rule announced by the North Carolina
court in the instant cases is sound. If liability of the owner is based
on common law principles of negligence, that is, reasonable foreseeability, all the characteristics of the attractive nuisance doctrine are
retained 15 with a flexibility which makes it possible to shape the rule to
fit the facts of each case, a necessity in the field of torts. 16 That may well
be illustrated by the results of the principal cases. In one there was an
unguarded reservoir, in the other an unguarded cement walk over a
river; in both the owner knew or had reason to know that children
would be attracted to his premises, and might reasonably have been
expected to anticipate the accident. It is difficult to distinguish the
App. Div. 11, 63 N. Y. S. 286 (1900); Campbell v. Model Steam Laundry, 190
N. C. 649, 130 S. E. 638 (1925).
"oUnited Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt, 258 U. S. 268, 42 Sup. Ct. 299, 66
L. ed. 615 (1922); Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n v. Compton, 39 Ariz.
491, 8 P. (2d) 249 (1932); Payne v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 52 Utah 598, 221
Pac. 568 (1923). But see Arkansas Power & Light Co., 185 Ark. 678, 49 S.W.
(2d) 353 (1932) (a dangerous situation in close proximity to an attractive situation must :be considered together as forming a dangerous and attractive whole).
'Loftus v. Dehail, 133 Cal. 214, 65 Pac. 379 (1901) ; Clark v. Pacific Gas &
Electric Co., 118 Cal. App. 344, 5 P. (2d) 58 (1931) ; McCall v. McCallie, 48
Ga. App. 99, 171 S. E. 843 (1933); Erickson v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 82
Minn. 60, 84 N. W. 462 (1900). In Coleman v. Robert Graves Co., 39 Misc.
Rep. 85, 78 N. Y. S.893 (1902), it was held that the object must be virtually a
trap, but ordinarily it seems to be sufficient if the danger is not common and
well-known. However, the owner is not bound to anticipate danger from the
unusual or improper use of an object safe in itself; Gilmartin v. City of Philadelphia, 201 Pa. 518, 51 At. 312 (1902).
" See infra note 18.
'McCall v. McCallie, 48 Ga. App. 99, 171 S.E. 843 (1916); Atlantic Coast
Line R. Co. v. O'Neal, 178 S.E. 451 (Ga. 1934) ; Gurley v. Southern Power Co.,
172 N. C. 690, 90 S.E. 943 (1916), but in this case the court apparently was influenced by the fact that the defendant's agent, secretly and against his instructions, operated a tank on the property as a swimming pool; Fiel v. City of Racine,
203 Wis. 149, 233 N. W. 611 (1930); RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) §339.
"Wilson, Limitations on the Attractive Nuisance Doctrine (1922) 1 N. C.
L. REv. 162.
1 It has repeatedly been held that adults are bound to anticipate "childish
instincts". Howard v. City of Rockford, 270 Ill. App. 155 (1933); Powers v.
Harlow, 53 Mich. 507, 19 N. W. 257 (1884); Campbell v. Model Steam Laundry,
190 N. C. 649, 130 S. E. 638 (1925); Whirley v. Whiteman, 38 Tenn. 610
(1858); RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) §290.
" Wilson, Limitations on the Attractive Nuisance Doctrine (1922) 1. N. C.
L. REv. 162.
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cases on the facts, yet the court reaches opposite results in each and
both are amply supported by authority. 1" However, the cases may be
reconciled by a theory which does not appear in the opinions. In the
Brannon case, the reservoir was useless and abandoned, and could easily
have been made safe for children. In the Boyd case, the property in
question served a very useful purpose which might have been wholly
or partly destroyed had the decision of the court been any different, since
children could hardly be kept off the bridge without a complete barricade of it. At any rate, the safe-guarding of the premises would have
been attended with great expense and inconvenience to the owner, and
every railroad bridge in North Carolina which is near a small settlement would necessarily have to be altered. Thus the court appears to
have invoked public policy in balancing the utility of the object with
the danger to trespassing children.1 8 It is submitted that the two principal cases, though aparently conflicting, are correctly decided.
MAURICE V. BARNHILL, JR.

Nonsuit-Waivevr of Motion by Cross-Examination
of Codefendant.
In a damage suit against the driver of an automobile and the
driver's employer, both defendants moved for nonsuit at the close of
the plaintiff's evidence and entered exceptions to the order overruling
their motions. The driver then introduced evidence including his own
testimony. The employer cross-examined the driver and witnesses
introduced by him, but offered no evidence himself. Plaintiff offered
17 Liability was established under substantially the same circumstances in the
following: Price v. Atchison Water Co., 58 Kan. 551, 50 Pac. 450 (1897) ; Howard
v. City of Rockford, 270 Ill. App. 155 (1933); Comer y. Winston-Salem, 178
N. C. 383, 100 S. E. 619 (1919) ; cf. Davoren v. Kansas City, 308 Mo. 513, 273
S. W. 401 (1925). Recovery was denied in the following: McCall v. McCallie,
48 Ga. App. 99, 171 S. E. 843 (1933); Gurley v. Southern Power Co., 172 N.
C. 690, 90 S. E. 943 (1916). Btit see comment in note 13, supra; Fiel v. City of
Racine, 203 Wis. 149, 233 N. W. 611 (1930).
"This was originally a primary consideration. In the Stout case, infra, it was
said that the turntable might have been made safe by the addition of a simple
and inexpensive lock. The omission of such simple safe-guards is negligent in
comparison with the unreasonable risk to children, 'but where such further safeguards are required as to interfere with the utility of the condition maintained
by defendant, then it cannot be said that the defendant is negligent in not rendering the condition safe. See Sioux City S. Pac. R. R. Co. v. Stout, 84 U. S. 657,
21 L. ed. 745 (1873); Peters v. Bowman, 115 Cal. 345, 47 Pac. 113 (1896);
Loftus v. Dehail, 133 Cal. 214, 65 Pac. 379 (1901) ; Brown v. Salt Lake City, 33
Utah 222, 93 Pac. 570 (1908) ; RESrATEMENT, ToRTs (1934) §339 Comment (d)
(A landownir is liable for injuries to children trespassing on his land caused by a
structure or other artificial condition thereon, if "the utility to the possessor of
maintaining the condition is slight as compared to the risk to young children
involved therein") ; Bauer, The Degree of Danger and the Degree of the Difficulty
of Removal of the Danger as Factors in "Attractive Nuisaiwe" Cases (1934) 18
MINx. L. RPv. 523.
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evidence in rebuttal. Both defendants then renewed their motions for
nonsuit and upon denial again excepted. After judgment against both
defendants, employer contends that on appeal he is entitled to the benefit of his first exception. Held, employer's motion for nonsuit should
have been granted whether evidence taken after his first exception be
considered or not.'
Under the North Carolina statute,? a motion to nonsuit must be
made at the close of plaintiff's evidence.3 If refused, defendant may
except and go to the jury upon the evidence ;4 or he may introduce evidence 5 and renew his motion for nonsuit at the close of all the evidence. 6 If he introduces no evidence, his exception to his first motion
is heard upon appeal; but if he elects to introduce evidence he waives
the benefit of his first exception and only his second exception is heard
upon appeal. 7 The instant case presents, but without the necessity
for an answer, the interesting question of whether defendant's subsequent cross-examination of his codefendant and codefendant's witnesses

8
constitutes a waiver of his previous motion for nonsUit.
'Van Landingham v. Singer Sewing Machine Co., 207 N. C. 355, 177 S. E.

126 (1934).
'N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §567; Riley v. Stone, 169 N. C. 421, 86
S. E. 348 (1915) (the power to grant an involuntary nonsuit is altogether statutory and did not exist prior to the Hinsdale Act of 1897).
'McKellar v. McKay, 156 N. C. 283, 72 S. E. 375 (1911) (reversible error to
sustain a motion to nonsuit upon plaintiff's evidence before he has rested his
case) ; Penland v. French Broad Hospital, Inc., 199 N. C. 314, 154 S. E. 406
(1930) (where defendant has not moved at close of plaintiff's evidence he cannot
avail himself of the statute by motion to dismiss at the end of all the evidence).
'N. C. C.ODE Am. (Michie, 1931) §567; Nowell v. Basnight, 185 N. C. 142,
116 S. E. 87 (1923).
"Under the statute, defendant may introduce evidence as a matter of right;
formerly it was a matter of discretion with the court. Means v. Carolina Cent.
R. R. Co. 126 N. C. 424, 35 S. E. 813 (1900); cf. Stith v. Lookabill, 71 N. C.
25 (1874) ; McIN osH, N. C. PRACrICE AND PROCnURE (1929) 612, N. 94.
'Means v. Carolina Cent. R. R. Co., 126 N. C. 424, 35 S. E. 813 (1900);
Penland v. French Broad Hospital, Inc., 199 N. C. 314, 154 S. E. 406 (1930).
Motion not allowed: after verdict, Vaughan v. Davenport, 159 N. C. 369, 74 S.
E. 967 (1912); nor after verdict set aside, Riley v. Stone, 169 N. C. 421, 86
S. E. 348 (1915) ; nor after judgment by default and inquiry, Mason v. Stephens,
168 N. C. 370, 84 S. E. 527 (1915).
7Debnam v. Rouse, 201 N. C. 459, 160 S. E. 471 (1931).
The original act,
P. L. 1897, Ch. 109, was construed to change the common law so as to allow defendant the benefit of both exceptions on appeal. Purnell v. Raleigh & Gaston R.
R. Co., 122 N. C. 832, 29 S. E. 953 (1898). But this result was criticised by
the court, Cox v. Norfolk & Carolina R. R. 123 N. C. 604, 31 S. E. 848 (1898),
and the act was amended, P. L. 1899. Ch. 131 and P. L. 1901, Ch. 594, to make
subsequent introduction of evidence by defendant a waiver of his first motion and
exception.
B The question may be important to a defendant, for a nonsuit will be denied
if there is more than a scintilla of evidence to go to the jury, and on the first
motion the court considers only plaintiff's favorable evidence introduced before
that motion was made, while on the second motion the court looks at the whole
case and considers all evidence favorable to plaintiff whether introduced by plaintiff, defendant, or elicited from any of the witnesses on direct or on cross-examination. Gates v. Max, 125 N. C. 139, 34 S. E. 266 (1899) ; Smith v. Cumberland
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Where a coparty testifies for himself at his own instance and is
cross-examined by his coparty, he does not become the latter's witness.9 Evidence elicited on cross-examination is generally regarded as
testimony of the party calling the witness and not of the party crossexamining. 10 Thus, at first glance, it would seem that defendant has
not "introduced evidence" within the rule of the statute, and therefore
has not waived his right to stand on the motion made at the conclusion
of plaintiff's evidence. But the case should be decided on broader
grounds.
After a defendant has had the benefit of two rulings by the court
and one by the jury, should he be given still another "bite at the
cherry"" by appellate review of his first position when only part of
the evidence was before the court? Even if defendant took no affirmative action whatever, why should not all the evidence in the case be considered on appeal? If there is but a single defendant in the case and
he elects to introduce no evidence after his motion for nonsuit is denied,
the case goes immediately to the jury. Where there are codefendants,
the court may enter a nonsuit as to one and permit the action to proceed
against the other. 12 But where nonsuits are denied codefendants and
either of them elects to introduce evidence, the other defendant cannot
appeal until the whole case goes to the jury and verdict is rendered
against him. Suppose in the meantime other parties and witnesses
present evidence sufficient for a jury verdict against both defendants.
Should the appellate court ignore the additional evidence, the verdict
and the judgment, and nonsuit a plaintiff who has obtained a just judgCounty Agricultural Society, 163 N. C. 346, 79 S. E. 632 (1913); Nash v.

Royster, 189 N. C. 408, 127 S.E. 356 (1925).
12 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE, (2nd. ed. 1923) §916 (4); See

McKELvEy, EVIDENCE

(4th ed. 1932) §283.

" Brown v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 39 Cal. App. 738, 179 Pac. 697 (1919);

Smith v. Atlanta & Charlotte Air Line R. Co., 147 N. C. 603, 61 S.E. 575 (1908).
North Carolina follows the so-called "orthodox rule," which permits a party to
cross-examine as to every issue in the case, whether presented by the direct examination or not, without making the witness his own. MCINTOSH, N. C. PR~cTICE AND PROCEDURE (1929) §566 (2); See WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE (2nd. ed. 1923)

§1885.

"At common law, the court disapproved of defendant's having "two bites
at a cherry" by "fishing for the opinion of the court" by a demurrer to the evi-

dence and afterwards introducing evidence if his demurrer was overruled.
Stith v. Lookabill, 71 N. C. 25 (1874) ; State v. Graves, 119 N. C. 822, 25 S.E.
819 (1896). The court criticised the rule of the statute before the "waiver"
amendment was added. Cox v. Norfolk & Carolina R. R., 123 N. C. 604, 31
S. E. 848 (1898) cited note 7 supra. The present statute must be strictly complied with before defendant can avail himself of it. Penland v. French Broad
Hospital, Inc., 199 N. C. 314, 154 S.E. 406 (1930) ; see note (1931) 9 N. C. L.
REv. 320.
I McNamee v. Borough Development Co., 134 App. Div. 666 119 N. Y. S.510,

(1909) ; Lee v. Penland, 200 N. C. 340, 157 S.E. 31 (1931).
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ment ?1 Such procedure would be a departure from the court's progressive policy of reversing only for prejudicial error and of settling
litigation in one suit wherever possible. 14
The court is authorized by statute "to render such sentence, judgment and decree as on inspection of the whole record it shall appear to
them in law ought to be rendered thereon."' 5 It is submitted that this
statute should be invoked to prevent useless nonsuits when sufficient
evidence for a judgment on the merits has been presented while the
defendant is still before the court.
R. MAYNE ALBRIGHT.
Real Property-Disposition of Real Property of Eleemosynary
Corporation upon Its Dissolution.
In 1912 Rosa Campbell conveyed for nominal consideration a lot
to "Rose Campbell Mission." The deed was in the usual form of deeds
of conveyance, and it contained no recitals as to the object or purpose
of the conveyance and no provisions as to trusts to be set up. Rosa died
in 1915, and the work of the Mission ceased. In 1931 the lot was condemned as a site for a high school, and an award was made to the
owners. Heirs of Rosa Campbell filed a petition claiming an interest
in the fund. A trustee, acting in behalf of the Mission, filed an exception to the auditor's report which directed the funds to be paid to the
heirs. The lower court overruled the exception. Held, since the Mission
was an unorganized society (it had not complied with the statute providing for incorporation of such organizations) and had wholly disbanded, the title to the land remained in the donor and accrued to her
heirs. Further, if the Mission had been organized and had dissolved,
the land would have reverted to the said heirs either under a District of
Columbia statute or at common law.'
The question presented by the principal case is, what (in the absence
"This is the "old-fashioned and mechanical way" not the "modern and progressive way" of dealing with technical errors of the trial court. WIGasOlM
Evidence, Impeachment of Witness on Cross-examination (1932) 26 ILL. L. Ray.
686, 687. See Cox v. Norfolk & Carolina R. R., 123 N. C. 604, 31 S. E. 848

(1898).
" Ball v. McCormack, 172 N. C. 677, 90 S. E. 916 (1916); Kimbrough v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 182 N. C. 234, 109 S. E. 11 (1921) ; In re Ross,
182 N. C. 477, 109 S. E. 365 (1921).
IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §1412; McINTosH, N. C. PRucmrCE AND
P~ocEDnRE (1929) §694; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §658. Cf. Amendment to Section 269 of Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. A. §391. It is now the settled
rule of appellate courts that verdicts and judgments will not be set aside for harmless error, or error which results in no substantial prejudice to appellant. fit re
Ross, 182 N. C. 477, 109 S. E. 365 (1921).
'Rose Campbell Mission v. Richardson, 73 F. (2d) 661 (App. D. C. 1934). A
District of Columbia statute provides that tht property in this situation shall
revert to the donor or his heirs. D. C. CODE (1929) Tit. 5 §321.
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of a statute) becomes of realty apparently granted in fee simple absolute to an eleemosynary corporation upon the dissolution of the corporation? At one time under the common law real property held by any
2
corporation reverted upon its dissolution to the grantor or his heirs.
It was said that the law annexed a condition of return, or the grant was
construed to be one only for the life of the corporation.3 At this
period, however, there were only municipal, ecclesiastical, and eleemosynary organizations, and business corporations of the modern type were
unknown. With the growth of the business corporation equity intervened to protect the rights of creditors and stockholders, 4 and now the
law is well settled that the property held by a business corporation goes
tupon dissolution first to pay the creditors and the remainder is distributed among the stockholders. 5
The law is not so well settled where eleemosynary corporations are
concerned. The same rule that governs business corporations has been
applied to eleemosynary corporations, thus allowing the property on
dissolution to go to the members." It has also been held that the property on dissolution may escheat to the state. 7 Some jurisdictions apply
the old common law rule and allow it to revert to the grantor or his
heirs. 8 Other courts allow the property to revert to the grantor if
it is a gift,9 but if it is a grant for valuable consideration, the members
of the defunct corporation are allowed to take it.10 One court has
held that if it is a grant for valuable consideration, it will escheat to
the state.11 The principal case in holding that the property procured
by donation reverted to the heirs of the donor is in line with a majority
12
of the cases.
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that property
owned by an eleemosynary corporation, upon its dissolution without
'Commercial Bank v. Lockwood, 2 Har. (Del.) 14 (1841); Bingham v.
Weiderwax, 1 Comstock 509 (N. Y. 1848); Fox v. Horah, 36 N. C. 358 (1840);
1 BL. Comm. 484.
'1 BL. Comm.* 484; 1 Co. LIrT.* 157.
See Bacon v. Robertson, 59 U. S. 480, 15 L. ed. 499 (1855) ; Havemeyer v.
Superior Court, 84 Cal. 327, 24 Pac. 121 (1890).
Richards v. North Western C6al and Mining Co., 221 Mo. 149, 119 S. W.
953 (1909); Wilson v. Leary, 120 N. C. 90, 26 S. E. 630 (1897); Service and
Wright Lumber Co. v. Sumpter Valley Ry., 81 Ore. 32, 158 Pac. 175 (1916).
oMcAlhany v. Murray, 89 S. C. 440, 71 S. E. 1025 (1911) commented on
(1911) 10 MIcH. L. Rav. 121.
' Mason v. Atlanta Fire Co. Number 1, 70 Ga. 604 (1883).
8Mott
v. Danville Seminary, 129 Ill. 403, 21 N. E. 927 (1889).
o People v. Brancher, 258 Ill. 604, 101 N. E. 944 (1913).
" Mobile Temperance Hall Ass'n. v. Holmes, 189 Ala. 271, 65 So. 1020
(1914) ; Bates v. Palmetto Society in Columbia, 28 S. C. 476, 6 S. E. 327 (1888).
" People of The State of California v. The President and Trustees of The
College of California, 36 Cal. 1166 (1869).
'Mott v. Danville Seminary, 129 Ill. 403, 21 N. E. 927 (1889) ; People v.
Brancher, 258 Ill. 604, 101 N. E. 944 (1913).
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creditors, goes to the sovereignty to be applied to a purpose similar to
that intended by the grantor.' 3 This solution is the best, for it is consistent with the rule of construction that the instrument is to be construed most strongly against the grantor; it obviates the necessity of
deciding that the transaction is either a gift or purchase; it comes
nearest to carrying out the intention of the grantor; it eliminates a windfall either for the heirs of the donor or members of the defunct corporation, and at the same time secures support for a worthy cause without
doing harm to any equities.
ROBERT BOOTH.

Taxation-Classification-Discrimination between
Corporations and Natural Persons.
A' Louisiana statute imposed upon every individual, firm, or corporation engaged in a dyeing, cleaning, pressing, or laundering business a
license tax measured by the gross receipts of the business.' The Louisiana Constitution,2 as construed by the Supreme Court of Louisiana,

exempted from license taxes persons engaged in mechanical pursuits
who perform their work with their own hands.3 A number of corporations, engaged in the laundry, dry cleaning, and dyeing business, sued
to enjoin the enforcement of the tax, asserting that it denied to them
equal protection of the laws. A three-judge Federal District Court
denied the injunction and held: that the statute is not invalid under the
Fourteenth Amendment; that the tax is not one upon receipts or upon
property, but that it is a license tax for the privilege of doing businessmeasured by gross receipts; that although corporations are excluded
from the exempt class for the reason that they, imaginary beings, cannot perform manual labor, the discrimination between corporations and
4
individuals is not unreasonable.
' Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U. S. 1,
10 Sup. Ct. 792, 34 L. ed. 478 (1889).
ILA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1932) §8612, provides: "That for every individual,
firm, association or corporation carrying on the profession or business of steam
dyeing, steam cleaning, steam pressing, or the business of steam or electric laundering, the license (tax) shall be based upon the gross annual receipts from such
profession or business, .. "
'Art. 10, sec. 8, reads as follows: "License taxes may be levied on such classes
of persons, associations of persons and corporations pursuing any trade, business,
occupation, vocation or profession, as the Legislature may deem proper, except
clerks, laborers, ministers of religion, school teachers, graduated trained nurses,
those engaged in mechanical, agricultural, or horticultural pursuits or in operating
saw mills. . .
'State v. Up-To-Date Shoe Repairing Co., 175 La. 917, 144 So. 714 (1932)
(this case also directly decides that the constitutional exemption does not apply
to corporations engaged in mechanical pursuits).
'White Cleaners & Dyers v. Hughes, 7 F. Supp. 1017 (D. C. La. 1934). The
Court decides that the tax is "for the privilege of doing business as distinguished
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This decision raises again the question, when, for purposes of tax
classification, may States discriminate between natural persons and
corporations ?
The right to classify subjects of taxation is a part of the taxing
power of the State. 5 The only restriction upon the exercise of this
right is that the classification must not be arbitrary, but must be reasonable under the circumstances and based upon some real difference in the
situation and character of the subjects taxed.6
Tax discrimination between corporations and individuals may be
attributed to a number of causes, chief of which have been the fear of
corporate power; the desire to exact from corporations a consideration
for the advantages of doing business in corporate form; the effort to
aid individual enterprises by placing tax burdens upon their corporate
competitors; a widespread feeling that corporations are better able to
pay; and the fact that the difficulty of concealing corporate property has
made the collection of taxes from corporations easier than from individ7
uals.
The Supreme Court early decided that the States may impose upon
from either property tax or a tax upon the business or its receipts." In distinguishing a tax upon a business from a tax upon the privilege of doing business
the Court relies upon Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. 342, 55
L. ed. 389 (1911) ; and it is also said that there is a difference between the "gross
receipts" tax, which was held invalid in Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania,
277 U. S. 389, 48 Sup. Ct. 553, 72 L. ed. 927 (1928), and the privilege tax imposed
by the Louisiana statute.
The Court's application of these two cases seems subject to criticism. Although
it was said in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. that the tax was for "a carrying on or
doing of business in the designated capacity" (corporate form of business organization), 220 U. S. 107, 150, the actual decision of that case does not cover the
present tax. There the tax was for the privilege of doing business in corporate
form. It was a franchise tax applicable only to corporations. Whereas the present
tax is a general license imposed upon everyone who exercises the privilege of
doing a cleaning and dyeing business, and it is equally applicable to individuals,
partnerships and corporations. It would seem that the Louisiana tax and the tax
involved in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. are of different natures and are imposed upon
different classes of subjects. The Court avoids the Quaker City Cab decision by
distinguishing a tax upon the privilege of doing business from a tax upon the
business. This distinction may be questioned upon the ground that the two taxes
result in the same ultimate burden upon a business.
' Home Insurance Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594, 10 Sup. Ct. 593, 33 L. ed.
1025 (1890) ; Brown-Foreman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U. S. 563, 30 Sup. Ct. 578, 54
L. ed. 883 (1910) ; see Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U. S. 137, 140-143, 45 Sup. Ct. 424,
426, 69 L. ed. 884 (1925).
'Bell's Gap R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 10 Sup. Ct 533, 33 L. ed.
892 (1889) ; Adams Express Co. v. Ohio Auditor, 165 U. S. 194, 17 Sup. Ct. 305,
41 L. ed. 683 (1897) ; Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 40 Sup. Ct.
560, 64 L. ed. 989 (1920).
See, dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Quaker City Cab Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 277 U. S. 389, 410, 48 Sup. Ct. 553, 558, 72 L. ed. 927 (1928), and
in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517, 541, 53 Sup. Ct. 481, 490, 77 L. ed.
929 (1933) ; Neihoff, CoRoATIONS AND THE TAX LAws (1931) 17 ST. Louis L.
REv. 27.
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corporations franchise and excise taxes which are not required of individuals. In 1868 two decisions sustained franchise taxes upon savings
institutions measured by the amount of their deposits., A third case in
the same year upheld a tax upon the income of insurance companies as
an excise upon their business.9 In 1873 a tax equivalent to a percentage
of the capital stock of railroad and canal companies was held valid as
a franchise tax upon corporations as legal entities ;LO and in 1890 it was
decided that a franchise tax upon all corporations measured by capital
stock did not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.". A tax imposed by Congress upon the gross annual receipts, in excess of $250,000, of corporations carrying on the business
of refining sugar was sustained as an excise tax.12
It is also well established that corporations may not be classified
separately from individuals on the sole basis of the ownership of property. 13 For this reason property taxes permitting the deduction of
mortgages on land owned by individuals, when a like deduction in the
case of land owned by corporations was not allowed, have been found to
violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 14 However, it has been held that
corporations may be treated differently from individuals for the purpose of collecting back taxes. 15
In the case of Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., which was before the Court
in 1911,16 a federal tax of one per cent of the net income of corporations
'Society for Savings v. Coite, 73 U. S. 594, 18 L. ed. 897 (1868) ; Provident
Institution v. Massachusetts, 73 U. S. 611, 18 L. ed. 907 (1868).
1 Pacific Insurance Co. v. Soule, 74 U. S. 433, 19 L. ed. 95 (1868).
'0Minot v. Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore R. Co., 85 U. S. 206, 21
L. ed. 888 (1873).
'Home Insurance Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594, 10 Sup. Ct. 593, 33 L. ed.
1025 (1890).
Spreckles Sugar Refining Co. v. McClain, 192 U. S. 397, 24 Sup. Ct. 376, 48
L. ed. 496 (1904).
'County of San Mateo v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 13 Fed. 722 (C. C. Cal.
1882) ; County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 18 Fed. 385 (C. C. Cal,
1883). See Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U. S. 389, 402, 48 Sup. Ct,
553, 555, 72 L. ed. 929 (1928) ; Gamble-Robinson Fruit Co. v. Thoresen, 53 N. D.
28, 204 N. W. 861, 865 (1925). In Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Walker, 47 Fed.
686 (C. C. N. D. 1891), Mr. Justice Caldwell said, "Property of the same kind, in
the same condition and used for the same purpose, must be taxed by a uniform
rule without regard to its ownership."
"County of San Mateo v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 13 Fed. 722 (C. C. Cal.
1882) ; County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 18 Fed. 385 (C. C. Cal.

1883).

"Florida Cent. & Peninsular R. R. v. Reynolds, 183 U. S. 471, 22 Sup. Ct. 176,
46 L. ed. 283 (1902) (back taxes from railroads); Fort Smith Lumber Co. v.
Arkansas, 251 U. S. 532, 40 Sup. Ct. 304, 64 L. ed. 396 (1920) (back taxes owed
by corporations upon stock held in other corlorations) ; White River Lumber Co.
v. Arkansas, 279 U. S. 692, 49 Sup. Ct. 457, 73 L. ed. 903 (1929) ('back taxes on
land owned by corporations).
1- 220 U. S. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. 342, 55 L. ed. 389 (1911).
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was upheld as a tax upon the privilege of doing business in a corporate
capacity. The rule was there laid down that corporations may be taxed
differently from individuals, inasmuch as there is a substantial difference between a business conducted by corporations and the same business when done by private individuals.IT But Quaker City Cab Co. v.
Pennsylvania's decided that a state tax upon the gross receipts of
transportation corporations, not imposed upon partnerships and natural
persons engaged in transportation business, violated the equal protection clause, because the tax was not peculiarly applicable to corporations.
This decision seems to restrict the broad rule laid down in Flint v. Stone
Tracy Co. governing tax discrimination between corporations and individuals. Mr. Justice Brandeis dissented from the Quaker City Cab
decision'0 on the ground that the imposition of heavier taxes on corporations than upon individuals had been approved in the Flint case, and
that a tax on gross earnings was a proper means of imposing the heavier
burden. The chain store tax cases, which have upheld tax classification
on the basis of the economic advantages incident to different types of
business organization, 20 may mark a change in the Court's attitude
away from the strict test applied in the Quaker City Cab case and back
to the general rule as stated in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.
The instant case presents a license or occupation tax, measured by
gross receipts and imposed on corporations while individuals are exempt.
In view of the Quaker City Cab test the present decision appears to be
wrong, for the license tax would have been equally applicable to individuals and partnerships engaged in the cleaning and pressing business.
However, the conclusion of the Court in upholding the tax is supported
by authority which was unquestioned before the decision of Quaker
City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvaniaand by subsequent cases which appear to
have shaken the standing of the Quaker City Cab holding.
The present decision seems to approve the imposition of a new
tax upon corporations. In addition to franchise taxes already placed
on the privilege of existing as a corporation, another tax is now applicable to the privilege afforded the corporate personality of doing a
particular type of business in competition with natural persons. It
would seem that the result of this decision is that corporations may be
subjected to both general franchise taxes and special license taxes upon
the privilege of engaging in grocery, manufacturing, banking, or any
- 220 U. S. 107, 161.
'277 U. S. 389, 48 Sup. Ct. 553, 72 L. ed. 927 (1928).
277 U. S. 389, 403.
' State Board of Tax Com'rs of Indiana v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 51 Sup. Ct.
540, 75 L. ed. 1948 (1931) ; Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517, 53 Sup.
Ct. 481, 77 L. ed. 929 (1933).

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

other business in a corporate capacity, without the imposition of these
taxes on individuals. 21
JoN R. JENKINS, JR.
Vendor and Purchaser-Construction of Instruments-Meaning
of Words "More or Less".
After pointing out its boundaries and corners to the plaintiff,
defendant contracted to exchange his farm, said to contain about 246
acres and valued at $18,000, for the plaintiff's farm plus $8,000. The
contract described defendant's farm as containing "247 acres more or
less." Several years later an anticipated sale of this farm was defeated
by the discovery of a forty acre shortage. In an action to recover for
this shortage, held judgment for defendant on the ground that this was
a sale by tract and the risk of deficiency was on the purchaser.'
The words "more or less" have been accorded varying significance
by the courts. The older rule, which purported to treat the words as if
they had a fixed and definite meaning in all deeds and land contracts,
announced that these words of themselves negatived a sale by acre, all
risk of variation being thereby placed upon the vendor in case of a
2
surplus, or upon the purchaser in case of a deficiency.
Realizing that the problem in such cases is one of construction, and
that the intention of the parties should be objectively ascertained in
order to give actual meaning to these words, most courts take into consideration the surrounding facts and circumstances of each case. Even
so, their treatment tends to become categorical. First, if the sale is
intended to be by acre, the words "more or less" will permit only slight
errors of survey or estimation, 3 and will not excuse substantial dis'A tendency to impose this additional tax upon corporations may be further
marked by a New York tax statute which provided that every transportation corporation, in addition to a franchise tax, "shall pay for the privilege of exercising
its corporate franchises or carrying on its business in such corporate or organized
capacity in this state, . . ." an additional franchise tax. N. Y. CONS. LAWs
(Cahill, 1930) c. 61, §184. This tax has been upheld by memorandum decision,
People ex rel New York & Albany Litherage Co. v. Lynch, 229 App. Div. 823,
242 N. Y. S. 903 (1930), aff'd per curiam 259 N. Y. 638. 182 N. E. 214 (1932),
aff'd per curiam 288 U. S. 590, 53 Sup. Ct. 400, 77 L. ed. 969 (1933) commented
upon (1933) 33 CoL. L. REv. 738.
'Huffman v. Landes, 177 S. E. 200 (Va., 1934).
2 Musselman v. Moxley, 152 Md. 13, 136 Atl. 48 (1927) ; Jollife v. Hite, 1 Call.
301 (Va., 1789) ; Keyton v. Brawford, 5 Leigh. 48 (Va., 1834) ; cf. Clark v. Carpenter, 19 N. J. Eq. 328 (1868). A series of more recent Georgia cases consider the
fact situation but hold the words "more or less" to be controlling: Goette v. Sutton,
128 Ga. 179, 57 S. E. 308 (1907) ; White v. Adams, 7 Ga. App. 764, 68 S. E. 271
(1910) ; Georgia etc. Co. v. Buck, 134 Ga. 674, 68 S. E. 514 (1910) ; Milner v.
Tyler, 9 Ga. App. 659, 71 S. E. 1123 (1911).
'Hodges v. Denny, 86 Ala. 226, 5 So. 492 (1888) ; Rathke v. Tyler, 136 Iowa
284, 111 N. W. 435 (1907); Wilson v. Randall, 67 N. Y. 338 (1876); Paine v.
Upton, 87 N. Y. 327 (1882).
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crepancies. 4 Second, where the sale is said to be in gross the courts
have laid down four different rules: (1) many cases hold the contract
to be one of hazard, placing the risk of variation on the parties to the
contract ;5 (2) another large group holds that the words merely guard
against slight errors of quantity, 6 and a substantial deviation will be
grounds for relief ;7 (3) a few have pronounced a definite percentage of
variation as a dividing line between the granting and refusing of
relief ;8 and (4) two courts have held the recital of area to be a warranty of quantity despite the "more or less" qualification. 9
'Triplett v. Allen, 26 Gratt. 721 (Va., 1875); Pratt v. Bowman, 37 W. Va.
721, 17 S. E. 210 (1893); cf. Sullivan v. Ferguson, 40 Mo. App. 79 (1867);
Frenche v. Chancellor, 51 N. J. Eq. 624, 27 At. 140 (1893).
Libby v. Dickey, 85 Me. 362, 27 Atl. 253 (1893) (relief denied when deficiency
was 400 out of 800 acres) ; Erskine v. Wilson, 41 S. C. 198, 19 S. E. 489 (1893)
(no recovery for 125 acres deficiency in 253) ; Waters v. Hutton, 85 Tenn. 109,
1 S. W. 787 (1886) (no relief when vendor's title to 64 acres out of 307 failed) ;
Trinkle v. Jackson, 86 Va. 238, 9 S. E. 986 (1889) (no relief for 440 acre deficiency
in 2376) ; Southern v. Sine, 95 W. Va. 634, 123 S. E. 436 (1924) (no recovery .for
29 acre deficiency in 170). See also Stebbins v. Eddy, Fed. Cas. No. 13,342 (C.
C. R. I. 1827) ; Frederick v. Youngblood, 19 Ala. 680 (1851) ; Harrell v. Hill,
19 Ark. 102 (1857) ; Dale v. Smith, 1 Del. Ch. 1 (1814) ; Beall v. Berkhalter, 26
Ga. 564 (1858) ; Armstrong v. Brownfield, 32 Kan. 116 (1884) ; Foster v. Byrd,
119 Mo. App. 168, 96 S. W. 224 (1906) ; Sprague v. Eypper and Beckman Inc.,
108 N. J. Eq. 239, 154 Atl. 615 (1931).
'Scott v. Dunkel Box etc. Co., 106 Ark. 83, 152 S. W. 1025 (1912) ; Russo v.
Corideo, 102 Conn. 663, 129 At]. 849 (1925); Kendall v. Wells, 126 Ga. 343,
55 S. E. 41 (1906) ; King v. Brown, 54 Ind. 368 (1876) ; Kitzman v. Carl, 133
Iowa 340, 110 N. W. 587 (1907) ; Couse v. Boyles, 4 N. J. Eq. 212 (1842) ; Oakes
v. DeLancey, 133 N. Y. 227, 30 N. E. 974 (1892); Watson v. Cline, 42 S. W.
1037 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897) ; Quesnel v. Woodlief, 2 Va. 173 (1808) ; cf. Wilson
v. Rafter, 188 Mo. App. 356, 174 S. W. 137 (1915); White v. Miller, 22 Vt.
380 (1850); McComb v. Gilkeson, 110 Va. 406, 66 S. E. 77 (1909).
'Hostleton v. Dickinson, 51 Iowa 244, 1 N. W. 550 (1879); Belknap v. Sealy,
14 N. Y. 143 (1856) ; Bigham v. Madison, 103 Tenn. 358, 52 S. W. 1074 (1899)
(rescission granted for 12.5 acre deficiency in 25) ; Pratt v. Bowman, 37 W. Va.
721, 17 S. E. 210 (1893) (relief granted vendor where there was an 80 per cent
excess). See also Hays v. Hays, 126 Ind. 92, 93, 25 N. E. 600, 601 (1890);
Wheeler v. Boyd, 69 Tex. 293, 297, 6 S. W. 614, 617 (1887).
' See Bigham v. Madison, 103 Tenn. 358, 363, 52 S. W. 1074, 1075 (1899)
(maximum discrepancy allowable is 10 to 15 per cent, 20 per cent is too great,
and 33 1-3 per cent is such an amount as "universally has obtained relief" even
though sale is in gross.) Cf. Pratt v. Bowman, 37 W. Va. 721, 17 S. E. 210
(1893). In Kentucky an inflexible rule was laid down in Harrison v. Talbot,
32 Ky. 258 (1834) (limits discrepancies in all sales in gross to ten per cent).
Followed: Anthony v. Hudson, 131 Ky. 185, 114 S. W. 782 (1908); Travis v.
Taylor, 118 S. W. 988 (Ky. 1909); Boggs v. Bush, 137 Ky. 95, 122 S. W. 220
(1909) ; Paisley v. Hatter, 143 Ky. 633, 137 S. W. 250 (1911) ; Salyer v. Blessing,
151 Ky. 459, 152 S. W. 275 (1913); Cook v. McKee, 235 Ky. 1, 29 S. W. (2d)
571 (1930). If sale is by boundary without reference to the number of acres, no
recovery for any shortage may be had. Wilson v. Morris, 192 Ky. 469, 233 S. W.
1049 (1921) ; cf. Sanders v. Lindsey, 204 Ky. 57, 263 S. W. 718 (1924) (where
deed specifically provided "that this land is sold by the boundary and not by the
acre," the purchaser of "300 acres, be the same more or less" could not recover
for 45 acre deficiency) ; Sheets v. McDonald, 213 Ky. 595, 281 S. W. 536 (1926)
(no recovery was allowed for 19.5 acre deficiency in 138, because it clearly appeared
that the parties intended to risk the contingency of quantity). Thus, by careful
drafting of deeds and contracts the effects of a rigid rule may be avoided.
'Gardner v. Kiburz, 184 Iowa 1268, 168 N. W. 814 (1918) ; Mahrt v. Mann,
203 Iowa 880, 210 N. W. 566 (1926) (because of Statute of Limitations plain-

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
In general the North Carolina cases consider the surrounding facts,
but they, too, place the cases in categories and decide them on the basis
of strict rules. Thus, if the parties to the contract intended a sale by
acre, a deficiency or surplus is a basis for relief,' 0 following the general
rule stated in the preceding paragraph. However, if the sale is held
to be in gross, then the first of the four rules mentioned above is applied,
and in the absence of fraud or misrepresentation the risk of divergence
is on the parties." In these sale by tract cases the doctrine, of caveat
emptor is applied, the court denying relief even where the deficiency is
very great.' 2 However, a vendor's representation of quantity, although
orally made, is held to be binding upon him.' 8
In construing these contracts the purpose of the courts should be to
effectuate the intention of the contracting parties, so far as possible, as
well as to preserve predictability of decisions for practical reasons. The
most reliable means of determining what is intended by the words "more
or less" is to construe them in the light of all the facts of the transaction:
price, type of land, size of tract, and situation of the parties are highly
relevant. Even where the sale is actually in gross the words should
not place risk of discrepancies upon the contracting parties unless the
facts show clearly that they anticipated assumption of the risk. This
test is applied in the instant case with a desirable outcome. Definition
and resultant legal effect must vary from case to case. It is submitted
that loss of consistency in decision (the most compelling reason for the
rigid North Carolina rule applied in the gross sales cases) is compensated
by the obviation of hardship in most cases.
WELCH JORDAN.
; Miller v. Wissert,
warranty)
implied
of
the
breach
tiff's only remedy was for
38 Okla. 808, 134 Pac. 62 (1913). In these cases the courts call the transactions
sales in gross, but in deciding the cases on the facts treat them as sales by acre.
the courts delete the words "more or less" from the agreement.
In effect
" 0Duffy v. Phipps, 180 N. C. 313, 104 S. E. 655 (1920).
a'McArthur and Walker v. Morris, 84 N. C. 405 (1881) (no relief for 90
acre shortage in 245) ; Smathers v. Gilmer, 126 N. C. 758, 36 S. E. 153 (1900)
(no recovery for 238 acre shortage in 500) ; Bethell v. McKinney, 164 N. C. 71, 80
S. E. 162 (1913) ; Turner and Parker v. Vann, 171 N. C. 127, 87 S. E. 985 (1916)
(no relief for deficiency of 170 acres in 550).
A failure of title in the absence of the covenant of seizin brings the same
result as in Smathers v. Gilmer, supra, when recital of acreage is qualified by the
words "more or less." Lantz v. Howell, 181 N. C. 401, 107 S. E. 437 (1921);
cf. Guy v. Joint Stock Land Bank of Columbia, 205 N. C. 357; 171 S. E. 341
(1933).
" Walsh v. Hall, 66 N. C. 233 (1872); Etheridge v. Vernoy, 70 N. C. 713
(1874). See also cases cited note 11, supra.
" Stern v. Benbow, 151 N. C. 460, 66 S. E. 445 (1909) ; and note language in
Smathers v. Gilmer, 126 N. C. 758, 759, 36 S. E. 153, 154 (1900).

